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This thesis applies quantitative methods to analyze attrition patterns and their 
demographic and pre-accession predictors among noncitizen and immigrant groups to 
assess the role of immigrants as a source of military manpower. Previous studies of 
noncitizen recruits have compared noncitizens to citizen recruits, but this study also looks 
at differences among the various noncitizen groups in terms of ethnicity and regions of 
origin. Past research has found that Hispanics, the largest group of noncitizen and 
immigrant recruits, do face unique challenges in their military experience when compared 
to citizens. This thesis looks at differences between Hispanics and other immigrant 
groups. This study uses data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for all 
enlisted service members who served in all branches of the Armed Forces between 2000 
and 2012. Our results show that immigrants reenlist at higher rates than nonimmigrants, 
citizens and noncitizens. Specifically, both immigrants and noncitizens from Asia reenlist 
at higher rates than citizens from North America. Additionally, our ethnicity interactions 
find that Pacific Islander noncitizens and immigrants reenlist at higher rates. In terms of 
attrition, both noncitizens and immigrants as a whole were less likely to separate for all 
five reasons (body fat, dependency, drugs/alcohol, disciplinary and unqualified), even 
with regional and ethnic interactions. Last, noncitizens are more likely to use the GI bill, 
but when adding interactions for region, the results showed that Asian and South 
American noncitizens were less likely to use the benefit. More in-depth research on the 
predictors of attrition and retention can serve as a guide for future recruiting and 
personnel policy implementation, as can the study of the various ethnic groups among 
Hispanics. 
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A. PURPOSE AND APPROACH 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the demographic and pre-accession 
predictors of retention, attrition and Montgomery GI bill use among noncitizen and 
immigrant groups to better recruit, train and retain them in the various military services. 
The study assesses the reliability of noncitizens and immigrants as a source of military 
manpower. Noncitizens and immigrants come from numerous backgrounds and many of 
them have valuable foreign language and cultural skills with strategic importance to the 
United States. Understanding how various noncitizen and immigrant groups differ, the 
military services can develop programs to mentor and develop those individuals who 
struggle to remain in the service.  
The study considers standard demographic variables that may impact retention 
specifically as they pertain to immigrant groups. Specifically, this study takes into 
account education level, aptitude test scores, race, ethnicity, age, branch of service and 
region of birth to better understand what variables are highly associated with longer 
careers in the service. This study also considers the cross-group propensities for various 
kinds of discharges from service to better understand the challenges these individuals 
face within the military. By looking at these factors across groups, the military can better 
understand some of the extrinsic or intrinsic motivators of immigrants and noncitizens 
who join the services. Finally, considering propensities to use the benefits per the 
Montgomery GI bill can assist manpower personnel in determining the value noncitizen 
groups place on further education and help them tailor incentive packages as necessary. 
With an approximate cost of over $14,000 to recruit and train a new service 
member per FY 2004 data, better understanding service member attrition is vital to 
reduce the military’s expenses (Hattiangadi et al., 2005). Studying what determines the 
success or failure of an individual once in the service, can reduce unnecessary spending 
by targeting the right individuals prior to enlistment. Additionally, it can assist the 
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Department of Defense (DoD) in improving programs or making policy that will ensure a 
lasting and diverse service. 
The data for this study comes from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). 
It includes demographic information, separation and immigration data for all enlisted 
service members who served in all branches of the Armed Forces between 2000 and 
2012. Using the data, this thesis presents quantitative analysis to predict the likelihood of 
reenlistment, attrition for various reasons and GI Bill usage among the immigrant and 
noncitizen groups.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions 
• Does noncitizen/immigrant status or group predict reenlistment in first 
term service members? 
• Does noncitizen/immigrant status or group predict separation/attrition for 
certain reasons among service members? 
• Does noncitizen/immigrant status or group predict likelihood of GI bill 
use? 
2. Secondary Research Question 
• Among the various noncitizen groups, are there differential impacts of 
demographic and pre-accession characteristics associated with higher or 
lower levels of reenlistment, separation/attrition or GI Bill use?  
C. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
You who have been born in America, I wish I could make you understand 
what it is like [to] not be an American—[to] not have been an American 
all your life—and then, suddenly, with the words of a man in flowing 
robes to be one, for that moment and forever after. One moment you 
belong with your fathers to a million dead yesterdays—the next you 
belong with America to a million unborn tomorrows. 
—George Magar Mardikian 
“Amazing Immigration Quotes” (2016) 
George Mardikian was an Armenian-born naturalized American citizen who was 
awarded the Medal of Freedom by President Harry S. Truman for his service in World 
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War II (“Amazing Immigration Quotes,” 2016). Noncitizen men and women enlist into 
the services for many reasons. Many of them have immigrated to the United States to 
escape violence or poverty and want nothing more than to start over in their new home. 
Service members and veterans are among the thousands that are granted citizenship each 
year. According to the 2016 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) naturalized 753,060 people in FY 16 and of those 8,885 were 
members of the military (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service [USCIS], 2016). 
According to the 2010 census, as cited in McIntosh and Sayala (2011), there are 
approximately 7 million 18 to 29-year-old noncitizens in the United States. Of those 7 
million, only 2.3 million have the required LPR for enlistment. Additional requirements 
limit this pool to 1.6 million for those who have a high school degree and of those, that 
number falls to 1.2 million who speak English well (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011). With the 
requirements for enlistment, the military services miss out on a large segment of the 
population that possesses valuable foreign language and cultural skills of strategic 
importance to the United States. As the recruiting pool of qualified individuals continues 
to dwindle due to a competitive talent market, and as McIntosh and Sayala suggest, low 
fertility rates, we must make use of the resources available to meet the recruiting mission. 
Current recommendations to reduce recruiting and retention expenses include 
spending money on bonuses or advertising as well as offering citizenship to noncitizens 
in exchange for enlisting (Cuhna, 2014). Although this study cannot measure the impacts 
such a policy would have on the military services, it does summarize instances in history 
when the military did use citizenship as an incentive much more openly. This study seeks 
to answer how the various noncitizen, ethnic groups, perform in the services as well as 
what characteristics make their performance unique. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II explores the background of immigration patterns in the United States 
from the 19th century to the present. Specifically, it examines the role of noncitizens and 
immigrants within the military services. Chapter III is a literature review of various 
qualitative and quantitative studies of attrition, promotion and propensity to serve. The 
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literature review focuses specifically on studies of Hispanics, the largest immigrant group 
serving in the U.S. military, and their performance in the military services. Chapter IV, 
describes the methodology, data, and provides summary statistics. Chapter V provides the 




A. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Events within the United States and around the world have affected the 
immigration patterns of the 19th century and the most current patterns of the 21st 
century. As a result, the U.S. population is incredibly diverse. It is important for its 
military service members to reflect the makeup of the civilian population to ensure that 
the services not only look like their civilian counterparts but that there is diversity in 
thought. Additionally, immigrants bring “language and cultural skills that are vital to 
national interest” (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011 p. 24). Therefore, it is important for us to 
study the history of immigration in the United States to know how immigration reform 
has affected the status of immigrants and what the military can do to attract their talent.  
1. 19th Century Immigration  
People have immigrated to the United States for many reasons, among them to 
escape religious persecution or war, to seek better economic conditions and escape 
poverty. Some people even immigrated forcibly via the international slave trade. 
According to an article by the History Channel titled “U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 
between 1815 and 1865, most immigrants originated from Northern and Western Europe 
with a third of immigrants hailing from Ireland due to its massive famine in the late 
1840s. In total, from 1820 to 1930, “4.5 million Irish migrated into the United States” and 
settled along the east coast (“U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 2009). The article states 
that, around the same time, 5 million Germans immigrated and settled in the Midwest. 
Additionally, in the early 1850s, some 25,000 Chinese immigrants settled in California 
lured by the gold rush.  
Following the Civil War and due to an economic depression, Congress passed 
stricter immigration policy in the 1880s leading to a decrease in immigration. Once again 
between 1880 and 1920, movement into the U.S. increased, resulting in the immigration 
of over 20 million people (“U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 2009). According to the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) fact sheet titled “An Overview of INS 
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History,” the influx of immigrants led to the opening of the immigration station at Ellis 
Island on January 2, 1892, as well as the creation of the Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization (which would eventually become the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in 1933) under the Basic Naturalization Act of 1906 (“Overview of INS History,” 
2012).  
2. 20th Century Immigration 
According to the USCIS as written in their electronic book, “Overview of INS 
History,” prior to WWI, the U.S. admitted over 14.5 million immigrants. Most of those 
immigrating hailed from Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, marking a shift from 
19th century immigration patterns (“Overview of INS History,” 2012, p. 6). By the early 
1920s, 4 million Italians and 2 million Jews entered the country to escape religious 
persecution (“U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 2009). Under the Immigration Act of 
1917, immigrants had to know how to “read and write in their native language” 
(“Overview of INS History,” 2012, p.6). They were also subject to a pre-inspection and 
an extensive medical exam at their country of origin. Immigration slowed down at the 
onset of WWI and into the Great Depression and WWII. The Immigration and Acts of 
1921 and 1924 set a limit on the number of immigrants every year. Each country received 
a quota based on previous census data (“Overview of INS History,” 2012). Therefore, 
between 1930 and 1950 the foreign-born population in the U.S. decreased from 11.6% to 
6.9% (“U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 2009). 
After WWII, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was enacted to allow the entrance of 
refugees from Europe and the Soviet Union who were unable to enter due to the quota 
system enacted in 1921 (“Overview of INS History,” 2009). Following the communist 
revolution in 1959, there were a large number of Cubans and escapees from communist 
countries who immigrated (“U.S. Immigration Before 1965,” 2009). Following the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, immigration from Asia and Latin America, 
increased due to the removals of the national origins system from 1924 and an emphasis 
on reuniting families via family sponsorship, as well as due to increased numbers of visas 
for skilled workers (“Overview of INS History,” 2009). The last major immigration 
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legislation took place with The Immigration Act of 1990 which created three separate 
categories for visas: family-sponsored, employee-sponsored, and diversity visa selected 
via lottery from certain countries (“Overview of INS History,” 2009). 
3. 21st Century Immigration 
Due to the American Competitiveness in the 21st Century Act (AC21) the number 
of Legal Permanent Residences granted has increased. AC21 increased the cap on H1-B 
visas granted also making them portable across different employers. H1B visas are 
granted to employees in specialty occupations whose employers submit applications on 
their behalf. AC21 specified that there would be no limitations on the number of H1-B 
visas granted to “employees of institutions of higher education, nonprofit research 
organizations or governmental research organizations” (American Competitiveness in the 
Twenty-first Century Act, 2000). 
According to the DHS’s Annual Flow Report in 2016, 1,183,505 immigrants 
attained LPR status. The report states that the leading regions of birth for LPRs were Asia 
and North American at 39%. The report also mentions that since 2009, both these regions 
have made up more than 70% of new LPRs. The leading countries of birth for LPRs in 
2016 were Mexico at 15%, China at close to 7% and Cuba at 5.6%. Additionally, it 
mentions that 68% of residence requests granted were family-sponsored, 12% were 
employment-based preference, 10% were granted to refugees and 3.1 to asylees 
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2017). In terms of state of residence, the flow 
report mentions that California, New York, Florida, Texas and New Jersey accounted for 
58% of new LPRs in 2016. All five states plus Illinois, have been the leading states of 
residence for LPRs since 1971. Although legal residents continue to reside mainly in 
these areas, the percentage of the proportion of legal residences granted in those states 
decreased from 82% in 1990 to 62% in 2016 (DHS, 2017). 
B. NONCITIZEN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Census Bureau places noncitizens in a special category of immigrants that 
includes LPRs, temporary migrants (which include students and temporary workers), 
refugees, asylees and unauthorized immigrants (Acosta et al., 2014). Due to the 
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incredibly diverse makeup of noncitizens, their characteristics differ significantly from 
the citizen population. Per a 2014 Census Bureau report titled “Noncitizens Under Age 
35: 2010–2012” by Acosta et al., 80% of noncitizens fall within the 18–34 age range 
(24.8% aged 18–24 and 55.3% aged 25–34) while only 47.3% (20.9% aged 18–24 and 
26.4% aged 25–34) of the citizen population lies within the same age range. The report 
also mentions that 60% of noncitizens aged 18–34 live in the states of California, New 
York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey and Illinois. Additionally, the authors of the report 
mention that the labor force participation rate of noncitizens in this age group is very 
similar to citizens, but they do differ in occupation type. Citizens tend to have jobs in the 
management, science, business and arts fields (39.1%), followed by sales jobs (24.6%) 
while noncitizens are employed in jobs within the service field (27.2%), followed by 
management, science, business and arts fields (24.5%) and lastly by natural resources, 
construction, and maintenance occupations (19.7%) (Acosta et al., 2014).  
Within the noncitizen population, the Census Bureau’s report, “Noncitizens 
Under Age 35: 2010–2012,” also found that educational attainment varies greatly across 
the various regions of birth (Acosta et al., 2014). Among noncitizens ages 18–24, 65% of 
noncitizens from Asia, 54% of noncitizens from Europe and 54% from Africa are ever 
enrolled in college while the number drops to 18% for those originating from Latin 
America. Additionally, of those noncitizens ages 25–34, 49% from Latin America have 
not graduated high school while 68% of those from Asia and 54% from Europe have 
attained education above a bachelor’s degree (Acosta et al., 2014). 
Regardless of their differences in educational attainment, noncitizens are 
restricted in their ability to serve in the U.S. military. Only those noncitizens with LPR, 
or “green card,” are able to enlist while even they are unable to commission as officers. 
Only special categories of noncitizens are able to enlist in the services under the Military 
Accessions Vital to National Interest (MANVI) Program without LPR (Department of the 
Navy, 2015). Despite these limitations, those noncitizens who have enlisted in the 
military throughout its history, have been an asset especially during periods of war. 
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C. NONCITIZENS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
1. History of Naturalizations in the U.S. Military 
According to the USCIS article, “Military Naturalization During WWII,” the 
Second War Powers Act of 1942 removed the requirement of citizenship to serve in the 
Armed Forces and authorized overseas naturalizations. During WWII, Congress acted to 
expedite citizenship for noncitizens serving in the armed forced and as a result, over the 
course of the war, 13,587 service members attained citizenship overseas (USCIS, n.d.b.). 
In February 1944, the Director of Research and Educational Services, Henry B. Hazard 
wrote in the Immigration and Naturalization Service Monthly Review about his overseas 
trips, traveling more than 40,000 miles to perform naturalizations, granting citizenship 
status to 3,678 service members from 66 countries. He wrote, “In general, those who 
have first-hand knowledge of them—the naturalization representative, their officers and 
comrades have been deeply impressed by the qualities of these new citizens. We have no 
fears as to their future effect upon us and our country but believe that they will fulfill the 
high duties of citizenship in equal degree with those of their native-born military 
associates” (Hazard, 1944, pp. 2–3). 
The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization wrote about the foreign 
born in the United States Army during WWII in an article published in the October 1948 
volume of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Monthly Review (Miller, 1948). He 
mentioned that between 1940 and 1945, over 109,000 of the 300,000 foreign-born 
enlisted service members in the Army were noncitizens. He stated that out of the 109,000 
soldiers, 19,299 were from Canada, 14,452 from Germany and 15,487 from Mexico. 
Approximately 30,000, or a quarter of noncitizens serving in the army, were born in 
enemy countries. Figure 1 shows the country of birth of those who enlisted in the Army 
by citizenship status and Figure 2 shows the distribution of noncitizens born in enemy 
countries serving at the time. 
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Figure 1.  Country of Birth of Foreign-Born, U.S. Army, By Citizenship Status: July 
1, 1940, to June 30, 1945. Source: Miller (1948). 
 
Figure 2.  Noncitizens Born in Enemy Countries, U.S. Army: July 1, 1940, to June 
30, 1945. Source: Miller (1948). 
 
According to Miller’s report, most of the noncitizens serving at the time were 
older than the average citizen service member. Of the 18 to 25-year-old white males, 
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31.1% were native born while only 7.7% were foreign males. Of the 18 to 30-year-old 
white males, 51.3% were native and 18.1% were foreign born. In Figure 3 from 
Commissioner Miller’s report, we see that the largest percentage of foreign-born white 
males were in the older age groups. 
Figure 3.  Age Distribution of White Males 18–44 Years of Age, by Nativity, for the 
United States: 1940. Source: Miller (1948). 
 
Additionally, The Commissioner explains that at the start of the war, per the 
Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, only those aliens who stated their intentions 
to become U.S. citizens could enlist in the military (Miller, 1948). Once Congress 
amended the law in 1942, all males ages 18 to 64 residing in the U.S. were required to 
register for the draft. Commissioner Miller wrote,  
It was recognized that the alien serving in the armed forces who desired to 
become a citizen of the United States was entitled to special consideration 
in his citizenship application. Many noncitizens in the armed forces were 
deeply appreciative of the opportunity to become citizens of the United 
States. That they did become citizens in large numbers was an impressive 
indication of their loyalty to the United States. (Miller, 1948, p. 54) 
a. Philippines Enlistment Program 
In a master’s thesis conducted by Luisito Maligat in 2000, he explains that “under 
a special agreement between the Filipino government and the U.S. Navy, the Philippines 
Enlistment Program (PEP) “was established as part of the Republic of the Philippines— 
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United States Military Bases Agreement (RP-US MBA)” (Maligat, 2000, p. 2). Between 
1952 and 1991, over 35,000 Filipinos enlisted in the U.S. Navy. The program came to an 
end in 1992 when the military bases in the Philippines closed in 1992. Maligat found that 
Filipinos who enlisted as part of PEP, had much higher short-term and long-term 
continuation rates, much higher promotion rates, and higher percentage of reenlistments.  
2. Current Military Policy Regarding Noncitizens 
In all branches of the military services, only citizens whether native or 
naturalized, LPRs and U.S. Nationals are eligible to enlist. U.S. citizens include people 
from the 50 states, the District of Colombia, Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands and 
the Northern Marianas Islands. Positions requiring a security clearance are generally 
reserved for U.S. citizens. Each service has detailed eligibility requirements based on the 
program, but the basic criteria is standard across all of them. Reenlistment requirements 
though, do vary. In, “Non-Citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” Hattiangadi, 
Quester, Lee, Lien and MacLeod, Reese & Shuford (2005) explain that in the Army, 
noncitizens can only serve up to 8 years (non-consecutive) as noncitizens. Air Force 
airmen can only serve one term, either 4 or 6 years, as noncitizens before they are 
required to naturalize to reenlist. The Navy and Marine Corps have no such restrictions 
on reenlisting as a noncitizen (Hattiangadi et al., 2005). 
(1) Age Requirements 
The Navy requires that those enlisting for active duty be between 18–34 years of 
age (17 with parental consent unless married then no consent needed) while those 
enlisting in the Navy reserves must be between the ages of 18–39 (Department of the 
Navy [DoN], 2015). The Marine Corps requires those entering the service to be between 
the ages of 17–29 years old and up to a maximum of 35 if they do not require recruit 
training (Marine Corps Recruiting Command [MCRC], 2011). The Army requires those 
enlisting into its active and reserve components to be between 17–35 years of age 
(Department of the Army [DoA], 2016). Lastly, the Air Force has the highest range of 
age eligibility and for both active duty and reserves requires its members to be between 
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17–39 at time of enlistment for non-prior service and up to 40 years of age for prior 
service applicants (Air Force Recruiting Service, 2005). 
(2) Dependency Requirements 
According to their respective recruiting manuals, all branches of the service 
prohibit unmarried applicants with dependents to join their active duty branches without a 
waiver. In most cases, married applicants with additional dependents up to a certain 
number are authorized with waiver approval. For applicants to the reserves, those that are 
unmarried with dependents may also receive waivers with the exception of the Marine 
Corps who will only entertain dependency waivers for the reserves if the applicant is 
married (MCRC, 2011). The Navy and Marine Corps recruiting manuals both stress how 
applicants with dependents usually suffer from family and financial hardships soon after 
enlisting, and both argue that the current dependency requirements “eliminate from 
consideration those who cannot balance the demands of family and service” (DoN, 2015, 
p. 164). 
(3) Educational Requirements 
Members enlisting into various military services must have earned their high 
school diploma, have attained their General Education Diploma (GED) or another high 
school equivalent. Additionally, applicants must pass the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and are placed into programs based on their Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) test scores. Regardless of attaining a passing grade on the 
ASVAB, in the Navy, those “whose English is a second language must be verified by 
LPO/LCPO” (DoN, 2015, p. 143). The Marine Corps similarly requires MEPS Liaison 
approval (MCRC, 2011, p. 3–19). Applicants in the Army and Air Force whose native 
tongue is not English are required to take the English Comprehension Level Test (ECLT), 
(AFRS, p.236) (DoA, 2016, p. 49). 
b. Immigration and Nationality Act 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), noncitizens serving on active 
duty in the armed forced, certain components of the National Guard and Reservists are 
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eligible to apply for citizenship, (Lee & Wasem, 2003). “During peacetime, noncitizens 
in the military may petition to naturalize after 3 years aggregate military service rather 
than the requisite 5 years of legal permanent residence” (Lee & Wasem, 2003, p. CRS-2). 
“During periods of military hostilities, noncitizens serving in the Armed Forces can 
naturalize immediately,” as designated by executive order, (Lee & Wasem, 2003, p. 
CRS-2). Tables 1 and 2 delineate the requirements for peacetime and wartime 
naturalizations. 
Table 1. Requirements for Peacetime Naturalization. Source: USCIS (n.d.a.). 
Be age 18 or older 
Have served honorably in the U.S. Armed Forces for at least 1 year and, if separated 
from the U.S. Armed Forces, have been separated honorably 
Be a permanent resident at the time of examination on the naturalization application 
Be able to read, write, and speak basic English 
Have a knowledge of U.S. history and government (civics) 
Have been a person of good moral character during all relevant periods under the law 
Have an attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution and be well disposed to 
the good order and happiness of the U.S. during all relevant periods under the law 
Have continuously resided in the United States for at least five years and have been 
physically present in the United States for at least 30 months out of the 5 years 
immediately preceding the date of filing the application, UNLESS the applicant has 
filed an application while still in the service or within 6 months of separation. In the 





Table 2. Requirements for Naturalization During Periods of Hostilities. Source: 
USCIS (n.d.a). 
Have served honorably in active-duty status, or as a member of the Selected Reserve 
of the Ready Reserve, for any amount of time during a designated period of hostilities 
and, if separated from the U.S. Armed Forces, have been separated honorably 
Have been lawfully admitted as a permanent resident at any time after enlistment or 
induction, OR have been physically present in the United States or certain territories 
at the time of enlistment or induction (regardless of whether the applicant was 
admitted as a permanent resident) 
Be able to read, write, and speak basic English 
Have a knowledge of U.S. history and government (civics) 
Have been a person of good moral character during all relevant periods under the law 
Have an attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution and be well disposed to 
the good order and happiness of the U.S. during all relevant periods under the law 
 
The INA also provides for posthumous citizenship to those who have died in 
active duty. In the “Naturalization Through Military Service: Fact Sheet,” the USCIS 
explains that the Naturalization at Basic Training Initiative established in 2009, gave 
Army recruits the opportunity to attain citizenship while completing basic training. Since 
2009, the program has expanded to the Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps, (USCIS, 
n.d.a.). Figure 4 summarizes data by the USCIS on military members who have attained 
citizenship by fiscal year. 
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Figure 4.  Naturalized Service Members Through FY-17. Source: USCIS (n.d.a). 
 
Portions of the law also authorize expedited citizenship for spouses and children 
of military members even when stationed abroad. Since fiscal year 2008 2,650 spouses 
from 33 countries have attained U.S. citizenship. The top countries include 964 spouses 
from Germany, 675 from Japan, and 464 from South Korea (USCIS, n.d.a.).  
c. Executive Order 13269 
On July 3, 2002, President George W. Bush designated the period starting in 
September 11, 2001, as a period of hostility via his Executive Order (EO) 13269 (Lee & 
Wasem, 2003). His EO allowed service members to apply for citizenship immediately 
upon joining the military service vice having to wait three years as was customary. The 
EO remains in place today but it was not the first legislation of the same kind. Policy 
makers have offered expedited citizenship as an incentive in both world wars, the Korean 
War and the Persian Gulf War (Cuhna, 2014). 
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D. SUMMARY 
Immigration patterns have varied throughout the 19th century and continue to in 
the 21st century. These variations are due in large part to changing laws enacted to 
support the U.S. economy as well as worldwide events that have forced the movement of 
people in and out of their original birth country. Europe, once the largest region of origin 
for immigrants, is now replaced by North America and Asia. Noncitizens, a special type 
of immigrant, include those who are in the U.S. temporarily either for school or work as 
well as humanitarian immigrants (refugees and asylees), LPRs and undocumented 
immigrants. Of the former, only those with a permanent residence are allowed to enlist 
and of them, many have attained citizenship while in military service as a result of laws 
enacted to either expedite or guarantee citizenship in exchange for honorable service. The 
following chapters present analysis conducted on cohort data from 2000–2015 for all 
services to analyze the makeup of noncitizens and immigrants within the services and 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following section summarizes general manpower trends and addresses 
several studies conducted in the areas of noncitizen and Hispanic motivators for 
enlistments, propensity to serve, as well as attrition, promotion and retention. It also 
includes analysis on the effects of policy on the propensity of noncitizens to enlist and to 
assess the effect of policy as an incentive for serving. 
A. GENERAL MILITARY MANPOWER TRENDS  
The propensity of men and women to enlist in the services has varied over time. 
Asch, Hosek and Warner (2007) summarize the events and trends which created the 
manpower challenges we face today and will face into the future in Chapter 32 of Sandler 
and Hartley’s Handbook of Defense Economics. The authors argue that the following 
have driven down both supply and demand for military manpower: the reductions in the 
force after the Cold War coupled with the rise in college attendance, the increasing 
operational demands on service members and, the increasing costs of military 
entitlements. 
As stated, the period after the Cold War saw drastic reductions in the force. 
Following these force reductions, the services experienced a tough recruiting 
environment as college attendance rates increased. The attendance rate for male high 
school students rose from 46.7% in 1980 to 61.2% in 2003 while the college attendance 
rate for female high school students rose from 51.8% in 1980 to 66.5% in 2003 (Asch, 
Hosek & Warner, 2007). It was so difficult to recruit in the late 1990s, that the Air Force 
missed its recruiting goal in 1999 and the Navy and Army missed theirs in 1998 (Asch et 
al., 2007, p. 1079). According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the 
“total undergraduate enrollment rate increased by 30%” between 2000 and 2015 (from 
13.2 to 17 million). Therefore, the military anticipated increased challenges in high 
school recruitment. “By 2026, total undergraduate enrollment is projected to increase to 
19.3 million students” (McFarland et al., 2017, p. 116). 
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Overseas deployment for U.S. troops has further negatively impacted recruiting 
efforts. Studies show that a faster operational tempo, places a heavier burden on troops 
(Asch et al., 2007, p.1076). A constant state of war makes serving in the military less 
attractive to those who would join because of the higher education benefits. This further 
complicates the problem of supply for the services. A study by Warner and Simon (2005) 
(as cited in Asch et al., 2007, p.1085), showed that the Iraq war had a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the number of Army high-quality recruits. Per their 
study, the variable associated with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), reduced high-
quality recruits in the Army by 34%. Additionally, of the eligible African American 
population, enlistments fell from 20% in 2000 to 10% in 2005.  
Asch et al. (2005) analysis also showed that the increasing costs of military 
entitlements and the shift toward deferring most of a service member’s military 
compensation has serious implications on the movement of personnel into or out of the 
services. The financial constraints the military services face in addition to the decrease in 
supply, will require more creative ways to incentivize recruits. The Blended Retirement 
System (BRS) that went into effect January 1, 2018, takes it upon the individual service 
member to contribute to a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) as part of his or her pension plan 
taking some of the accounting burden away from the DoD and onto the individual. 
Approximately 83% of those who join the military attrite before they are eligible to retire 
and receive a pension. The BRS is beneficial to those who choose to leave before 
retirement because they can leave the service with a retirement fund in the form of their 
TSP matching contributions (“The Blended Retirement System,” 2017). The effects of 
the BRS on military manpower are unknown but a study by the RAND Corporation 
estimates that the new system will maintain the desired force size for enlisted personnel 
as long as continuation pay is at projected levels, but officer retention is projected to fall 
(Asch, Mattock, & Hosek, 2017).  
Due to the increased manpower requirements placed on the services and the tough 
recruiting environment they face, noncitizens, particularly Hispanics who are the largest 
group of noncitizens, are a likely target to fix the decreasing enlistment supply. Asch et 
al. (2007) study shows that Hispanics have a higher likelihood of joining the service than 
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other ethnic groups, yet they are also less likely to qualify for the service. The following 
is a closer look at how the previously mentioned manpower trends have affected 
noncitizen and Hispanic motivations, propensity to enlist and remain in the service. 
B. STUDIES ON NONCITIZENS’ MOTIVATIONS TO SERVE 
There is limited research on the motivation of noncitizens in joining the U.S. 
military, but generally research suggests that noncitizens have different motivations than 
their citizen counterparts. Although citizenship through service is increasing in general, 
the efficacy of policy changes, such as EO 13269 which enabled service members to 
receive expedited citizenship, are not clear.  
In a study by Omer Senturk and Lynn O’Neil (2004) titled, “Noncitizens in the 
U.S. Military,” the authors take a qualitative approach to research the motivations behind 
noncitizen enlistments. Overall, their results show that in most cases, those who enlist are 
motivated to join the service as a way to provide a better future for their families. 
Noncitizens tend to immigrate into areas where they can have a large support system and 
they are influenced by family and friends when looking for employment. Additionally, in 
most cases, noncitizens tend to have higher levels of education if attained in their birth 
country. The qualitative data for the study consisted of 10 interviews with country of 
origin per Table 3. 
Table 3. Distribution of Interviewees by Service. 
Source: O’Neil & Senturk (2004). 
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Of those interviewed, six entered the U.S. via family sponsorship visas, two via 
diversity visas and two were undocumented immigrants. All ten, enlisted as noncitizens 
and half attained citizenship while on active duty. One of the interviewees was currently 
in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and one of the interviewees was a woman (O’Neil 
& Senturk, 2004, p. 25). The interview questions focused on the following topics: 1) “the 
reason why the enlistee and/or the enlistee’s family chose to immigrate” 2) “whether 
immigration was a family or individual decision” 3) “the level of formal education 
completed by the enlistee” 4) “the motivations for enlistment” and 5) “the individual’s 
plans for the future” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 27). 
To the question regarding the enlistees’ reasons for immigrating, the responses 
centered around achieving material improvement, achieving maximum level of 
satisfaction both monetary and non-monetary as well as attaining a better future (O’Neil 
& Senturk, 2004, p. 28). In response to the question on immigration as a family decision, 
eight of ten interviewees affirmed that the decision was a family decision of which all 
eight sent remittances back to their birth country. Additionally, all interviewees moved to 
areas of significant immigrant populations upon arriving to the U.S. except the service 
members from Cambodia and the Philippines (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 29). In 
response to the question on education, four of the five enlistees who attained their highest 
level of schooling in their birth country, attained a level of education above a high school 
diploma. All five of those who attained the highest level of schooling in the Unites States, 
attained no more than a high school degree. Overall, those who immigrated after 
finishing high school, were much more likely to aspire to higher education. To the 
questions regarding employee motivation, almost all those interviewed mentioned job 
training or experience as the motivation for enlisting but most were unable to go into the 
occupation of their choosing due to security clearance requirements. All four Filipinos 
either had friends or family members who had served and only two mentioned expedited 
citizenship as a motivation for enlisting (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 31–32). Finally, 
regarding the question on future career plans, only four of those interviewed planned to 
reenlist.  
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The qualitative results of the study are worth considering but taking surveys of a 
larger population of noncitizens may lead to more accurate results. Based on their 
analysis, Omer Senturk and Richard O’Neil recommend the services take a closer look at 
the billets presently coded for security clearances to assess if the services can declassify 
some of them to open more billets to eligible noncitizens who may have qualifying 
aptitude scores. They also recommend implementing an immigration quota available to 
noncitizen applicants to enlist in exchange for citizenship or offer noncitizens unique 
reenlistment incentives to include citizenship. Additionally, because family ties were 
such a large aspect of the interview responses, the authors recommended the DHS 
provide expedited citizenship not just for those who serve but also their family members. 
Huseyin Yalcinkaya, Melih Can and Jesse Cuhna analyzed the effects of EO 
13269 on the enlistment of noncitizen recruits but do not find significant impacts of the 
EO on noncitizen enlistments (Cuhna, 2014, p. 1) (Yalcinkaya & Can, 2013, p. 1). In 
their thesis titled, “The Effects of Executive Order (EO) 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted 
Accessions in the U.S. Military,” Yalcinkaya and Can analyze the following questions: 
“Did the enactment of EO 13269 improve the number of noncitizen accessions to the 
U.S. military?,” “What is the value of noncitizens as sources of manpower?” and “Do 
noncitizens take into consideration the value of becoming a U.S. citizen when making 
enlistment decisions?” (Yalcinkaya & Can, 2013, p. 2) The thesis utilizes DMDC data, 
covering “1,983,707 enlisted prior and non-prior service accessions from FY 2000 to FY 
2010” as well as unemployment rates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) website 
(Yalcinkaya & Can, 2013, p. v).  
The thesis uses an OLS regression with a Difference-in-Difference model before 
and after the EO. “Citizen accessions were set up as a control group and noncitizen 
accessions were the treatment group” (Yalcinkaya & Can, 2013, p. 40). Yalcinkaya’s 
research found that noncitizen accessions dropped by 16% and total accessions dropped 
by 8.41% after the EO. The decrease in noncitizen enlistments was greater than that of 
citizen enlistments after the policy, therefore, it was concluded that the EO had “no effect 
or a negative effect on noncitizen enlisted accessions to the military” (Yalcinkaya & Can, 
2013, p. v).  
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In his paper titled, Expedited Citizenship for Sale: Estimating the Effect of 
Executive Order 13269 on noncitizen military enlistments, Cuhna assesses the “effect of 
EO 13269 on noncitizen enlistments” (Cuhna, 2014, p. 1). His model uses U.S. military 
personnel data covering all services from 1999–2010. The method of analysis is “a 
difference-in-difference model with accessions” among citizens as the control group 
(Cuhna, 2014, p. v) . The econometric equation is as follows: 
( 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
)it = βo + β1Noncitizeni + β2POSTt + β3(NonCitizen*POST)it +δTimet +ɣ(Time*POST)t +μt + εit 
The abovementioned model works “under the assumption that” there is “no effect 
on the propensity” of “U.S. citizens to enlist” and that “there are no time-varying factors 
other than the EO that affect noncitizens and citizens” (Cuhna, 2014, p. 10). The 
denominator used, “total eligible population” is an estimate based on census data but 
since the estimate is used for both a regression on total accessions and the individual 
regressions conducted per service, there is most likely measurement error since entrance 
requirements differ by service. The model includes monthly fixed effects to control for 
summer months with higher accessions (Cuhna, 2014, p. 10). Cuhna found no effect from 
the EO on total accessions amongst noncitizens but does find “significant shifts of non-
citizen enlistments out of combat intensive services and into” the “safer” services (Air 
Force, Navy and Coast Guard) (Cunha, 2014, p.15-16). Additionally, he finds a “positive 
and significant effect” from the EO on the “number of highly educated noncitizen 
accessions” (Cuhna, 2014, p. 5–16).  
The findings give us some insight into what motivates noncitizens. Since 
noncitizens who join the service have to have a LPR to join the service, their pathway to 
citizenship has already begun and joining for the sake of attaining citizenship may not be 
a large enough motivator. If the services were to offer citizenship for service to those 
without LPR, the results could differ greatly and the policy could have significant effects. 
Yalcinkaya recommends removing LPR as a requirement for enlisting in the military to 
expand the number of those eligible to enlist and expand supply. He also recommends 
looking at data farther prior to the EO to see if the results changed more significantly. 
Additionally, he felt a study focused on the motivations of active-duty noncitizens would 
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help tailor future incentives to attract noncitizens to military service. Cuhna recommends 
collecting reason for enlistment data, to observe whether noncitizens value citizenship as 
an incentive. 
Since policies like EO 13269 utilize citizenship as a motivator for enlisting, it is 
important to consider whether military personnel are actually able to attain citizenship 
through service. Studies address how well the services are doing in assisting service 
members in attaining citizenship once recruited. In the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
report, “Noncitizens in the enlisted U.S. Military-CNA Report 2011,” Molly F. McIntosh 
and Seema Sayala research how the services assist “noncitizen recruits with 
naturalization” and “to what extent do noncitizen recruits naturalize while serving?” 
(McIntosh & Sayala, 2011, p. 3). All services, except for the Marine Corps, have 
established naturalization training programs at boot camp, therefore one of the report’s 
focuses was assessing the success of those programs in increasing the number of 
naturalizations after enlisting (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011).  
The report finds that citizenship attainment is increasing although there is likely 
measurement error in the data due to inaccurate personnel files. Since service members 
do not have an incentive to report their status after naturalizing, the results most likely 
understate the true number of service members who attain citizenship (McIntosh & 
Sayala, 2011, p. 13). Attainment is much higher in the Air Force due to service limits on 
noncitizens. Air Force service members are required to attain citizenship prior to 
reenlistment. Minorities, females, married with dependents, “education and AFQT” are 
all variables “positively related to citizenship” attainment (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011, p. 
15). Lastly, they find time to citizenship is decreasing but is highest in the “Marine Corps 
followed by the Navy, Air Force and the Army” (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011, p. 17). The 
authors of the study believe the “services should consider strategies to recruit noncitizens 
more effectively” as the propensity to enlist continues to decline as well as improve 
information sharing between DoD and USCIS on citizenship attainment and attrition to 
make better assessments of the data (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011, p. 21). 
The authors of the various studies on motivation for enlistment recommend that 
the services consider better solutions to effectively recruit noncitizens. EO 13269 
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indirectly attempts to incentivize noncitizens to enlist by allowing them to apply for 
citizenship immediately after enlisting. Yet, studies show that the EO has not 
significantly increased the number of noncitizen applicants. The studies do show how 
certain demographics within the noncitizen population behave which could provide 
valuable insight into future policy implementation. Additionally, results show noncitizens 
are largely motivated to join the service to provide a better future for their families. 
Lastly, other results show that the number of citizenship attainments has increased but the 
services need to accurately advertise these success stories to ensure noncitizens are aware 
of the opportunity. With a more robust advertising campaign to target noncitizens along 
with the removal of LPR as a prerequisite to enlist, the services could tap into a large and 
valuable market. 
C. STUDIES ON HISPANICS’ PROPENSITY TO SERVE 
Following the end of the Cold War, the military services have run into a tough 
recruiting environment due to increases in college attendance. Compounding the lack of 
enlistment supply, studies show there is little the services can do in terms of recruiting to 
affect propensity. A study conducted by Warner, Simon and Payne (2003), on the Navy 
college fund and enlistment incentives, found “that personal attributes and family 
background factors play a dominant role in determining propensity,” and that propensity 
is not affected by the intensity of recruiting efforts (p. vii). 
To further address the propensity issues, other researchers have tried to narrow 
down some of the personal, demographic and family attributes which affect propensity to 
serve. Specifically, several studies center around the propensity of Hispanics to serve 
since they are the largest group of noncitizens within the US. In the 2009 RAND study, 
“Military Enlistments of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Asch, Buck, 
Klerman, Kleykamp & Loughran, addressed policymakers’ interest in the 
underrepresentation of Hispanics in the military despite the increase of the population of 
Hispanics in the United States in the previous decade. In a poll conducted by the DoD in 
2007, 12.6% of Hispanics, ages 18–24 stated they were most likely going to join the 
military while only 6.6% of whites said they would. These numbers would suggest an 
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overrepresentation of Hispanics in the military. Yet in 2007, when the Hispanics 
population (ages 18–40) was 17%, “only 11.4% of Army enlistment contracts and 15 
percent of Navy enlistment contracts” were from Hispanics (Asch, Buck, Klerman, 
Kleykamp & Loughran, 2009, p. xv). The study examined the following: 1) “entry 
standards most likely to disqualify Hispanics from military” recruitment, 2) the effects of 
lowered recruiting standards on performance, and 3) the incentives most likely to 
increase Hispanic enlistment (Asch, et al., 2009, p. 4). Due to data limitations, the 
analysis was done on the overall Hispanic population vice analyzing the subgroups of the 
Hispanic population. 
The strong propensity of Hispanic high school graduates to serve in the military 
coupled with their underrepresentation, “suggests that Hispanic graduates and seniors are 
disqualified for service on the basis of other factors” (Asch et al., 2009, p. 3). The authors 
collected data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) along with 
DMDC data for all enlisted personnel who entered the military from 1988–2002. They 
then identified five entry standards that were possible predictors of disqualification: 
“Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), body weight, number of dependents, criminal 
activity, and substance abuse” (Asch et al., 2009. p. 21).  
Prior studies showed that failure of obtaining a high school diploma was the 
strongest reason for the Hispanic underrepresentation in the military. This study 
identified difficulty in meeting AFQT standards and weight standards as two other main 
causes for the underrepresentation. AFQT, education and weight were not associated with 
lower promotion or retention. Overall, the study found that 88% of white Army recruits 
remain in service after 3 months while 92% of Hispanic recruits do so. Additionally, only 
17% of white E-5s are promoted by the sixth year (in the Army) while 22% of Hispanics 
are promoted (Asch et al., 2009, p. 69). The study also found that Hispanics generally 
have higher and faster promotion rates than whites in the military (Asch et al., 2009, p. 
117).  
The econometric analysis of the RAND study suggested several policy 
implications for the military in the future: creating programs to help recruits meet 
physical fitness standards prior to entry, relaxing weight standards at entry, varying 
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weight standards by occupation, relaxing weight standards while maintaining strength 
standards (specifically in the Marine Corps), and recruiting healthier populations 
(noncitizens who can pass the weight standards) (Asch et al., 2009, p. 119).  
Another study by Asch, Buck, Klerman, Kleykamp & Loughran (as cited in Asch 
et al., 2007, p. 1090), conducted in 2005 also showed that a large percentage of Hispanics 
fail to meet AFQT or weight standards. Most of the disqualifying AFQT standards were 
due to weak English proficiency. The study found that even if the military relaxed the 
weight standard by 10 pounds, Hispanic enlistments would not increase since most of 
them fail to meet the standards by more than 10 pounds. Additionally, there appears to be 
a correlation between weight and other disqualifying standards, so again, relaxing the 
weight standards may not necessarily yield significant increases in Hispanic enlistments. 
In the thesis titled, “An Exploratory Study of Hispanic Officer Recruiting in the 
Mexican-American Community of South-Central Los Angeles: Implications for the 
Officer Corps of the Future,” Javier Hernandez addresses the propensity of Hispanics to 
serve as commissioned officers. The thesis is a qualitative study of 14 interviews from 
teachers, counselors, JROTC instructors, recruiters, church pastors and priests from Los 
Angeles. Overall, the study identified lack of academic achievement vice lack of interest 
in the military as the reason for Hispanics not aspiring to military service. The study also 
found that youth in certain areas of the country, like Los Angeles, have limited 
opportunities to attain “higher education because of poor academic preparation, 
underdeveloped English-language skills, poverty, and crime” (Hernandez, 2003, p. v). 
Limited opportunities lower the chances of Hispanics enlisting or commissioning. 
Additionally, the innate obligation Hispanics feel to care for their families also serves as 
a detractor from serving in the military.  
Based on these findings, the author recommended implementing a more robust 
Officer recruiting program in high school as well as more “cooperation between 
recruiting and the admissions department at the Naval Academy” (Hernandez, 2003, p. 
103). He also recommended conducting a study on Junior Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (JROTC) units as to why there are no units in inner-city Los Angeles. Lastly, he 
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suggested the military capitalize on Hispanic influencers especially when advertising for 
officer programs, (Hernandez, 2003, p. 95–100). 
In the thesis titled, “Hispanics in the U.S. Military,” William Arias and Selcuk 
Dal (2006) use qualitative and quantitative methods to identify Hispanics’ propensity to 
enlist and addresses “their role in meeting the military’s future manpower needs. The 
qualitative analysis consists of interviews with 10 active duty Hispanics, two high school 
counselors and two JROTC instructors, (Arias & Dal, 2006, p. i). The active duty service 
members interviewed are both female and male from the Navy of ranks E-3 to O-5 with 
anywhere from 3 to 30 years of service. Their ethnicities include, “Mexican, Mexican-
German, Mexican-Irish, Mexican-Cajun, Salvadoran, Puerto Rican, and Guatemalan” 
(Arias & Dal, 2006, p. 29). 
The interview responses show that clerical figures are no longer as important 
influencers as are peers and family members. “The senior active duty respondent, an O-5, 
believes that part of the reason for a lack of Hispanic representation in the higher O-6 and 
above ranks is due to family. He believes most Hispanics are unwilling to sacrifice family 
life for the demands of senior military officer life” (Arias & Dal, 2006, pp. 33–34). Also, 
the responses suggest that because Hispanics tend to live in school districts where schools 
are of lower quality, it affects their graduation rate. Additionally, respondents “hinted 
about an underground economy where money is plentiful without the need of a high 
school diploma” (Arias & Dal, 2006, p. 33). Many Hispanics are conditioned to work as 
soon as possible to provide financial support for the family. They also see their parents 
doing fine without a high school diploma and feel they can do the same. Hispanics’ weak 
English language is also a hurdle which affects their education opportunities or desires to 
attain further education. Lastly, most active duty members interviewed were unaware of 
JROTC and did not know anyone who had joined through JROTC. Teachers interviewed 
felt “the program needed much more visibility and interaction” within “the school 
administration” (Arias & Dal, 2006, p. 35). 
Overall, studies on propensity to enlist and commission focusing on the largest 
group of noncitizens, Hispanics. The results show that AQFT, high school graduation 
rates and weight standards are the largest factors affecting propensity to serve. Studies 
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suggest that the military should play a more active role in grooming and preparing 
Hispanics to successfully graduate high school and educate them on the many benefits 
that the military can provide for them via its JROTC units.  
D. STUDIES ON NONCITIZEN AND HISPANIC ATTRITION 
Despite challenges in recruiting and enlisting Hispanics, many studies show that 
once in the military, Hispanics are highly successful. Overall, studies of noncitizen and 
Hispanics, show that they have lower levels of attrition and higher levels of promotion 
and retention. In their thesis titled, “Noncitizens in the U.S. Military,” Omer Senturk and 
Lynn O’Neil, use quantitative analysis to examine the performance of noncitizens versus 
citizens in the enlisted ranks. The quantitative data for the study comes from “enlisted 
cohort data for FY 1990–1998” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 81).  
To analyze the data, separate multivariate probit models for attrition, retention 
and promotion were estimated for each of the services, (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 61). 
The dependent variables included “first-term attrition, retention beyond the first term, and 
promotion to E-4” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 46). The independent variables included, 
“AFQT percentile, education categories, marital status, age at time of enlistment, race/
ethnic group and number of dependents” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 47). The results 
from the quantitative portion found that first-term attrition rates were “significantly lower 
for noncitizens and” the “predicted retention beyond the first term and promotion to E-4” 
were “significantly higher” (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004, p. 78). 
In the CNA report, “Noncitizens in the enlisted U.S. Military” (2011), Molly F. 
McIntosh and Seema Sayala analyze performance of noncitizens at first-term. The data 
used in the study comes from DMDC and includes FY 99 through FY 08 all service 
accessions tracked through June 2010. The authors of the study ran a logit regression to 
“model attrition behavior as a function of citizenship status at accession and other 
(demographic and service-related) characteristics” (McIntosh & Sayala, 2011, p. 78). 
Like Senturk and O’Neil’s’ results, the report found that noncitizen recruits attrite at 
lower rates than citizens recruits.  
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The CNA report titled, “Non-Citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” by 
Hattiangadi, Quester, Lee, Lien, MacLeod, Reese & Shuford (2005), further assesses 
whether certain noncitizen characteristics predict attrition. The study uses DMDC data on 
accession from all four services for FY88-FY02. The analysts ran an attrition logit model 
with the following independent variables: “educational attainment and intelligence of the 
recruit, participation” in DEP, “accession in the summer months, accession waivers, 
marital/dependency status, race/ethnic background, and noncitizen status” (Hattiangadi et 
al., 2005, p.52) as well as control variables for the FY of accession. Their dependent 
variable was attrition. 
To analyze attrition, the researchers ran two separate logistic regressions for FY88 
through FY94 accessions and FY95 through FY02 accessions. The results were as 
follows: 
(1) 3-month attrition:  
• Noncitizens had 3-month attrition rates 1.8% lower in the first cohort 
group and 3.7% lower in the second cohort group 
• When they interacted citizenship status with ethnic code they found that 
“Black, Asian Pacific Islanders (API) and Hispanic noncitizens predicted 
to have 3-month attrition rates” 7–8% lower than “white citizens. Only 
Native-American noncitizens had a “higher attrition than” white citizens. 
When they included race and ethnicity interactions they found that the 
“marginal effect on attrition from non-citizen status,” increased 
(Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 57)  
• There was a small positive effect on attrition from waivers of which the 
largest of the effects came from medical or physical waivers (Hattiangadi 
et al., 2005, p. 58) 
• High quality recruits had 3-month attrition rates that were 2.8% lower 
(Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 59) 
• The longer a recruit was in DEP the lower the 3-month attrition  
• Female recruits had attrition rates that were 5.1% higher than male 
recruits. The higher female attrition was the case in all services but was 
highest in the Army where females had attrition rates 9 percentage points 
higher followed by the Marine Corps at 5% higher (Hattiangadi et al., 
2005, p. 59) 
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• Those with dependents had attrition rates 2.1 percentage points higher 
except in the AF (Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 59) 
(2) 36-month attrition:  
• Noncitizen “36-month attrition rates” were 9–20 “percentage points lower 
than white citizens” (Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 1)  
• Those with “GEDs and 1-semester college accessions,” had 36-month 
attritions “rates 9.5 and 7.8 percentage points higher than those” with a 
high school diploma (Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 64) 
• Recruits with waivers had attrition rates 1.7 to 5.3 percentage points 
higher than those without waivers (Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 65) 
• In the Marine Corps, attrition was 3.2 percentage points below the Army 
because they take most of their attrition at the start of enlistment.  
• Female recruits have higher attrition at 36-months but the results vary 
from 3.4% points higher in the Navy to 18.6 percentage points higher in 
the Army (Hattiangadi et al., 2005, p. 67) 
• Attrition at 36-months for those with dependents upon enlistment are 
lower in the AF but higher in the other services. 
William Arias and Selcuk Dal (2006) also look at attrition within the enlisted 
ranks but specifically at Hispanic attrition. They also analyze promotion and retention of 
Hispanic recruits. They use DMDC enlisted cohort data for all service from 1992–2005 
and utilize a multivariate econometric model of military attrition, promotion, and 
retention with separate models for each service due to differing enlistment requirements. 
The results were as follows: 
(3) 6-month attrition:  
• Hispanics have “attrition rates that range from” 3 “percentage points” to 
24 “percentage points lower than” non-Hispanics (Arias & Selcuk, 2006, 
p. 70–71) 
• In the Navy, number of dependents increases early attrition. 
• The higher the age the higher the probability of early attrition.  
• Females had lower early attrition in the Navy. Air Force and Marine Corps 
have higher early attrition rates (in the first six months). Finally, marriage 
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at enlistment is associated with higher attrition (Arias & Selcuk, 2006, p. 
71) 
(4) First-term attrition: 
• Rates are lower for all Hispanic ethnicities. Other Hispanics in the Air 
Force have 5% lower attrition than non-Hispanics and Latin Americans in 
the Navy have attrition rates 24% lower than non-Hispanics (Arias & 
Selcuk, 2006, p. 71)  
• Unlike early attrition, “number of dependents is associated with lower first 
term attrition” (Arias & Selcuk, 2006, p. 74) 
• Age (greater) is associated with higher attrition as is marriage.  
• Females and more dependents are associated with higher retention. 
(5) Retention beyond first-term: 
• Retention is higher for Hispanics than other ethnic groups. 
• The retention rates range from “1 percentage point higher for” Mexicans 
“in the Navy to 16 percentage points higher for Puerto Ricans in” the 
Army when “compared to non-Hispanic whites” (Arias & Selcuk, 2006, p. 
78) 
• Retention beyond first term is highest for Hispanic enlistees in the Army 
than the other services.  
• Increasing numbers of dependents increases probability of reenlistment.  
(6) Promotion to E-4: 
• Promotion rates range from 4% higher for “Other Hispanics” in Air Force 
to 17% higher for Puerto Ricans in the Army.  
• Females promoted at lower rates.  
• AFQT, marriage and dependents have positive effects on promotion. 
Studies on promotion, retention and attrition show that both noncitizens and 
Hispanics perform favorably once in military service compared to their citizenship 
counterparts and member of other ethnicities. This thesis looks at specific drivers of 
attrition and how Hispanics noncitizens perform. 
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E. SUMMARY 
Prior studies show that both noncitizens and specifically Hispanic service 
members have lower levels of attrition throughout their career, as well as higher levels of 
promotion and retention. Due to fierce competition for talent the military services face, 
noncitizens are a valuable source of manpower. A study of the demographic and pre-
accession variables which make noncitizens most likely to enlist may yield answers to 
positively affect recruiting and personnel policy.  
Prior studies have focused on the differences in retention, promotion and attrition 
between citizen and noncitizen groups, but the following is a look at how the various 
noncitizen groups differ amongst each other and how we can target some of these ethnic 
groups to maximize supply. Additionally, prior studies touched on the need to assess 
country of origin or home of record (state) to see how these variables affect enlistments. 
Therefore, with access to those variables, this study will also look closer at the impact 







IV. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. DATA  
The thesis uses data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). It 
includes home of record, demographic data, number of dependents, immigration and 
separation data for all enlisted military personnel who served between 2000 and 2012. 
Although officer data was available, I chose to remove these observations since officers 
cannot commission without U.S. citizenship. The data includes 5,634,399 observations. Of 
these 373,707 are from the Navy, 1,283,454 are from the Marine Corps, 2,377,863 are from 
the Army and 1,412,064 are from the Air Force. The number of observations for the Navy 
is unusually low, therefore we expect some of these observations were most likely coded 
incorrectly under the Army or Marine Corps. 
1. Dependent Variables 
The intention of this thesis is to measure the impact of being a non-citizen on 
retention. To that end we also examine the motivation and ability of enlisted personnel by 
looking at whether they use the GI bill, or attrite before the end of their first term for 
various reasons. To create our reenlist dependent variable we coded the first term end date 
variable using each member’s service obligation end date and also used data on career 
status which described whether someone was in their first term, second term or whether 
they were a careerist. The variable takes the value of one in the year someone reenlists in 
the U.S. military, and the value of 0 for any year in which a first term person does not 
reenlist.  
To examine various reasons for first-term attrition. We create additional dependent 
variables for attrition due to failure to qualify, inability to meet body fat standards, 
dependents, drugs and alcohol, and disciplinary issues. The 2009 RAND study, “Military 
Enlistments of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities,” by Asch, Buck, et al. 
identified five entry standards that were possible predictors of Hispanic disqualification, 
based on the NLSY and DMDC data for all enlisted personnel who entered the military 
from 1988–2002: “AFQT, body weight, number of dependents, criminal activity, and 
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substance abuse” (Asch et al., 2009. p. 21). Qualitative studies mentioned in the literature 
also identify family as a major motivator for enlistment and in driving decision making, 
therefore, attrition for dependency reasons I felt was worth investigating (O’Neil & 
Senturk, 2004). We examine whether issues with these factors also drive early attrition for 
certain immigrant/non-citizen groups.  
Data on the Montgomery GI bill use came from the Veteran’s Administration. 
Census data shows that educational attainment varies greatly among the various regions of 
birth with Asians typically attaining higher education than Hispanics (Acosta et al., 2014). 
Additionally, literature also found that noncitizens and immigrants tend to attain higher 
levels of education in their birth country (O’Neil & Senturk, 2004). Our results and analysis 
on GI bill usage can help us asses the relative importance of the benefit to non-citizen and 
immigrants and in so doing assess whether it is an important recruiting tool for these 
groups.  
2. Independent Variables 
To create our noncitizen and immigrant variables we used immigration data from 
DMDC. I used U.S. citizenship status codes to create a binary variable for noncitizens 
which includes all members who are not yet citizens and those who are U.S. nationals. 
Since U.S. nationals are not citizens yet, I wanted to include them in the noncitizen variable 
but, unlike other noncitizens, U.S. nationals are allowed to enlist without having LPR. I 
chose to include them in the noncitizen variable because they are also not citizens upon 
enlistment. Additionally, U.S. nationals would differ significantly from the citizen 
population especially in terms of race and ethnicity.  
To create the immigrant variable, I used U.S. citizenship origin code information. 
The immigrant variable is made up of those who became U.S. citizens by naturalization 
while the nonimmigrant dummy variable includes those who were born in the U.S., Guam, 
Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, those whose parents became citizens by naturalization 
and those born outside the U.S. to at least one citizen parent. Non-citizen immigrants are 
coded as missing. This results in 5,553,751 observations of noncitizens and 5,246,922 
observations of immigrants which are a relatively small but notable populations to study.  
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I also include control variables for AFQT, age and dependent quantity, race, 
ethnicity and service component. Education includes dummy variables for high school 
diploma, no high school diploma, some college, bachelors, masters and above and an 
“other” category. Those with a high school education make up the largest proportion of the 
observations at 74%. Next, the race dummy variables were created out of 64 different race 
values and compiled into white, black, Asian, Pacific Islander and American 
Indian/Alaskan Native. Then, the ethnic dummies were created out of 23 different values 
and were compiled into the following categories: Hispanic, Asian, Pacific Islander and an 
“other” category. Finally, I also incorporate AFQT percentile score, age and dependent 
quantity. 
I created interaction variables between noncitizen and ethnicity as well as 
noncitizen and region of birth to analyze whether there were significant differences in pre-
accession variables among the various subgroups. I used country home of record 
information to code region dummies from over 500 countries into the following nine 
regions: Asia, Middle East, Europe, North America, Central America, South America, 
Caribbean, Africa and Oceania. While many of those with overseas homes of record are 
immigrants or non-citizens, the region dummies will also include American recruits who 
enlisted while their parents were stationed or otherwise resided overseas.  
Tables 4 and 5 provide a summary of each variable, its components, values and 
descriptions.  
Table 4. Dependent Variable Description 
Variable Value Definition 
Reenlist  1,0 Value of 1 if service member reenlisted prior to end of first term 
GI Bill Ever  1,0 Value of 1 if ever used GI Bill 
Separation Codes 
Unqualified 1,0 Value of 1 if service member separates due being unqualified 
Body Fat 1,0 Value of 1 if service member separates due to body fat standards 
Dependency 1,0 Value of 1 if service member separates due to dependents/dependent care 
Drugs/Alcohol 1,0 Value of 1 if service member separates due to drug and alcohol reasons 
Disciplinary 1,0 Value of 1 if service member separates for disciplinary reasons 
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Table 5. Independent Variable Description 
Variable Value Definition 
Noncitizen 1,0 Value of 1 if service member is a noncitizen 
Immigrant 1,0 Value of 1 of service member is an immigrant 
Education Codes 
High School 1,0 Value of 1 if service member has a high school education 
No High School 1,0 Value of 1 if service member has no high school diploma 
Some College  1,0 Value of 1 if service member has attended some college 
Bachelors 1,0 Value of 1 if service member has a bachelor’s degree 
Masters and 
Above 
1,0 Value of 1 if service member has a master’s degree or above 
Other Education 1,0 Value of 1 if service member has other education 
AFQT 0-93 Armed Forces Qualification Test Percentile Score 
Race Codes 
White Race 1,0 Value of 1 if service member is White 
Asian Race 1,0 Value of 1 if service member is Asian 
Black Race 1,0 Value of 1 if service member is Black 
Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
1,0 Value of 1 if service member is American Indian or Alaskan Native 
Pacific Race 1,0 Value of 1 if service member is of the Pacific Islander race 
Ethnicity Codes 
Hispanic 1,0 Value of 1 if service member’s ethnicity is Hispanic 
Asian 1,0 Value of 1 if service member’s ethnicity is Asian 
Pacific Islander 1,0 Value of 1 if service member’s ethnicity is Pacific Islander 
Other 1,0 Value of 1 if service member’s ethnicity if Other 
Age 16-93 Service Member’s age 
Dependents 0-15 Dependent Quantity 
Service Component Code 
Army 1,0 Value of 1 if member’s service is Army 
Air Force 1,0 Value of 1 if member’s service is Air Force 
Navy 1,0 Value of 1 if member’s service is Navy 
Marine Corps 1,0 Value of 1 if member’s service is Marine Corps 
Country Home of Record 
Asia 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in Asia 
Middle East 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in the Middle East 
Europe 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in Europe 
North America 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in North America 
Central America 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in Central America 
Caribbean 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in the Caribbean 
South America 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in South America 
Africa 1,0 Service member’s home of record country is in Africa 




B. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Prior to running regressions to analyze the effects of the independent variables 
onto the probability of reenlisting, attrition, or GI bill use, I ran the summary statistics for 
all my variables to get a closer look at my data. Table 6 contains the number of 
observations, means and standard deviations for all my variables. Noncitizens and 
immigrants each make up about 2% of our observations. Of all service members in the 
data set, a little over 10% chose to reenlist in any given year. Based on the reasons for 
attrition included in our analysis, disciplinary had the highest proportion of observations 
with .5%. Overall, there is very little pre-term attrition, therefore attrition for 5 of the 
reasons rarely occurred in our data.  
In terms of education, most service members at least finished high school at 
92.4%, which makes sense since this is a requirement for enlisting in all the services with 
few exceptions. The next highest proportion of education completed was “some college” 
at 3.4% followed by a bachelor’s at 2.7%. It makes sense that a larger percentage of 
service members take some college courses but not all of them actually finish their 
bachelor’s degree. For the AFQT variable, the mean average score in our data was 63.2 
which coincides with a Category IIIA score. The required AFQT scores for enlistment 
changes often and by service but they generally require a score above 30. Therefore, it 
makes sense for our average to land somewhere in the middle at 63. 
In terms of race and ethnicity, white makes up the largest race category at 78.3% 
while black comes in second at 15.6 and Asian at 3%. Other makes up the largest 
ethnicity category at 75.2% followed by Hispanic at 19.2%, Asian at 3% and Pacific 
Islander at 2.6%. Most of the blacks and the preponderance of whites consider 
themselves “other” in the ethnicity category, although many Hispanics would have coded 
themselves white in the race category, which is why it is not strange that 75.2% of the 
ethnicity category falls into “other.”  
Next, the mean age of those in our sample is 22 and their mean number of 
dependents is .5. Those numbers are accurate since our sample only includes those in 
their first term of service who are younger and tend to enlist right out of high school. 
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Therefore, they are usually not married and have no kids. Those that are single with kids 
or have one or more dependents are less likely to join due to ineligibility or dependency 
waiver disapproval. Lastly, as one looks at the regions of the home of record variables, it 
makes sense that most of our observations fall within North American at 98.7% since this 
includes nonimmigrants and citizens which also make up the largest percentage of our 
observations. 






Noncitizen 5,553,751 0.02078 0.14263 
  
Immigrant 5,246,922 0.02036 0.14122 
    Reenlist 5,634,399 0.10423 0.30556 
Attrition Reason 
Drugs/Alcohol 5,634,399 0.00165 0.04057 
Unqualified 5,634,399 0.00158 0.03968 
Body Fat 5,634,399 0.00076 0.02762 
Dependency 5,634,399 0.00114 0.0337 
Disciplinary 5,634,399 0.00572 0.07239 
    GI Bill Ever 5,634,399 0.19118 0.39323 
Education 
High School 5,496,727 0.92401 0.26498 
No High School 5,496,727 0.00988 0.09891 
Some College 5,496,727 0.03479 0.18324 
Bachelor’s 5,496,727 0.02652 0.16069 
Master’s and Above 5,496,727 0.00177 0.04198 
Other Education 5,496,727 0.00303 0.05498 




1. Summary Statistics by Group 
To further summarize the data, I looked at all my variables by immigrant and 
citizenship to see how they differed. Table 7 provides a summary of the average of each 
variable by group. Out of all four categories, immigrants are more likely to reenlist at 
13.3% percent while nonimmigrants, citizens and noncitizens are all on average about 
Race 
Asian 5,389,514 0.02977 0.16995 
Black 5,389,514 0.15619 0.36303 
White  5,389,514 0.78343 0.41191 
American Indian/ 
Alaskan Native 5,389,514 0.01295 0.11308 
Pacific Islander  5,389,514 0.19154 0.07073 
Ethnicity 
Hispanic 2,927,948 0.19154 0.39351 
Asian 2,927,948 0.03016 0.17102 
Pacific Islander 2,927,948 0.0259 0.15884 
Other 2,927,948 0.7524 0.43162 
    Age 5,634,036 21.9632 3.82834 
    Dependent Quantity 5,501,565 0.58549 1.00482 
Branch of Service 
Army 5,634,399 0.42203 0.49388 
Marine Corps 5,634,399 0.22779 0.41941 
Navy 5,634,399 0.06633 0.24885 
Air Force  5,634,399 0.25061 0.43337 
Region Home of Record 
Asia 5,481,919 0.00075 0.02736 
Middle East 5,481,919 0.000035 0.005839 
Europe 5,481,919 0.00126 0.0354 
North America 5,481,919 0.98671 0.11453 
Central America 5,481,919 0.000029 0.00539 
Caribbean 5,481,919 0.000024 0.00489 
South America 5,481,919 0.000011 0.00328 
Africa 5,481,919 0.000091 0.00951 
Oceania 5,481,919 0.000026 0.00507 
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10% likely to reenlist. When it comes to GI bill use, noncitizens are more likely to use 
the benefit at 25.4% which is over 5% higher than the average from Table 6. All other 
categories have about the same likelihood of use at 18 to 19%.  
In terms of the education variables, nonimmigrants have higher rates of high 
school completion than immigrants at 93% and 84.3% respectively, yet immigrants are 
more likely to attain a bachelor’s degree and some college. On the other hand, citizens 
and noncitizens have very similar values for all education variables. The majority of both 
citizens and noncitizens (92%) attain a high school education. For AFQT percentile 
scores, nonimmigrants have scores that are on average 3 points higher than immigrants. 
The difference is larger among noncitizens and citizens. Noncitizens have an average 
score of 56 while citizens have an average score of 63. The results are as expected since 
our literature mentions lack of English proficiency as a reason for lower qualifying scores 
among noncitizens.  
In terms of race, most immigrants are Asian at 32.5% and the largest percentage 
of noncitizens are black at 24.1%. Overall, although Asian, black and Pacific Islander 
enlistments are low in comparison to whites, they are all well represented among non-
citizen and immigrant enlistments. Additionally, noncitizens and immigrants in all three 
races, are more likely to join than their citizen/native counterparts. The largest percentage 
of whites, American Indians and Alaskan natives are nonimmigrants and citizens as one 
would expect. Within our ethnicity variable, one sees that the large majority of Hispanics, 
Asians and Pacific Islanders are immigrants and noncitizens while most in the “other” 
category are nonimmigrant and citizens. Pacific Islanders and Hispanics are 
overrepresented among noncitizens and immigrants while underrepresented among 
citizens and nonimmigrants.  
In regards to the age value, there is a slight difference between immigrant and 
citizen groups. Both immigrants and noncitizens have average ages that are slightly older 
than nonimmigrant and citizen groups. Additionally, all groups have the same average 
dependent of less than 1 and while nonimmigrants and citizens are more likely to join the 
Army or Marine Corps, immigrants and non-citizens are more likely to join the Air Force 
or the Navy.  
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immigrant Non-citizen Citizen 
Reenlist 0.132574 0.101519 0.106113 0.103921 
Attrition Reason 
Drugs/Alcohol 0.000964 0.001646 0.000919 0.001678 
Unqualified 0.001049 0.001645 0.000806 0.001585 
Body Fat 0.000534 0.000791 0.000286 0.000771 
Dependency 0.000964 0.001173 0.000537 0.001142 
Disciplinary 0.003061 0.005451 0.003215 0.005309 
     GI Bill Ever 0.188979 0.189714 0.253965 0.188965 
Education 
High School 0.842525 0.929375 0.914968 0.925507 
No High School 0.006444 0.010158 0.008936 0.009909 
Some College 0.061866 0.031920 0.036071 0.034406 
Bachelor’s 0.078870 0.024037 0.035649 0.025611 
Master’s and 
Above 0.008374 0.001407 0.003181 0.001532 
Other Education 0.001921 0.003104 0.001195 0.003036 
     AFQT 60.43855 63.35648 55.60908 63.43007 
Race 
Asian 0.324672 0.018788 0.200688 0.024276 
Black 0.185924 0.154799 0.241032 0.153162 
White  0.424596 0.798638 0.502492 0.792048 
American Indian/ 
Alaskan Native 0.005934 0.013029 0.007296 0.013184 
Pacific Islander  0.029959 0.003770 0.025955 0.004714 
Ethnicity 
Hispanic 0.352519 0.169715 0.510285 0.179812 
Asian 0.225528 0.020226 0.116950 0.025495 
Pacific Islander 0.158360 0.018096 0.125214 0.021774 
Other 0.263593 0.791964 0.247551 0.772919 
     Age 23.90505 21.87029 22.78561 21.92504 
     Dependent 
Quantity 0.645709 0.584688 0.533162 0.585513 
  
 44 
Branch of Service 
Army 0.394782 0.435635 0.197758 0.419499 
Marine Corps 0.179645 0.236134 0.231469 0.226712 
Navy 0.125009 0.066696 0.494153 0.065492 
Air Force  0.294750 0.253470 0.067383 0.254550 
Region Home of Record 
Asia 0.003357 0.000627 0.004997 0.000683 
Middle East 0.000249 0.000031 0.000019 0.000035 
Europe 0.001899 0.001208 0.001099 0.001240 
North America 0.977392 0.988266 0.972577 0.987036 
Central America 0.000058 0.000027 0.000087 0.000028 
Caribbean 0.000086 0.000019 0.000083 0.000019 
South America 0.000077 0.000007 0.000045 0.000009 
Africa 0.000288 0.000057 0.000344 0.000078 
Oceania 0.000029 0.000024 0.000102 0.000025 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Due to the binary nature of my dependent variables, the method employed in this 
thesis was the linear probability model. Our models sought to predict the effects of 
various pre-accession and demographic variables on noncitizens and immigrants’ 
probability of remaining in military service past their first term, their probability of 
separating for specific reasons and their probability of using the GI bill. I focused my 
analysis of retention on service members who made their decision to reenlist prior to the 
end of their first term. To measure reason for separation or attrition as well as GI bill use, 
I included observations for all members, who based on the data, completed their first 
term. 
1. Retention Beyond First Term 
First, to predict retention beyond first term among noncitizens and immigrants I 
ran the following linear probability models on the population of first-term enlisted 
personnel in the U.S. military between 2001 and 2013: 
(1) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟  
(2) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
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After running models 1 and 2, I ran them again controlling for education, AFQT 
scores, race, ethnicity, age and branch of service to see whether these variables had an 
effect on the noncitizen and immigrant coefficients. Including the vector of control 
variables Z with vector of coefficients B, I designate these models as follows:  
(3) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(4) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + BZ 
Apart from analyzing whether immigrant or citizenship status affected 
reenlistment in first term service members, I also looked to see whether region home of 
record or ethnicity affected propensity to reenlist. Our base categories for these models, 
as was the case in the rest of our analysis, were North America for region home of record 
and “other” for ethnicity. I ran all models with and without control variables. The models 
I employed were as follows: 
(5) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
(6) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
(7) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
(8) 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
2. Attrition in First Term 
Second, to predict the effects of noncitizen and immigrant status on specific 
reasons for separation during first term I ran the following models with and without 
control variables: 
(9) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
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(10) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(11) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(12) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(13) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(14) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(15) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵    
(16) 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(17) 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
(18) 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵  
After running the initial models to see how immigrants and noncitizens differed 
from nonimmigrants and citizens in terms of separations, I also added interactions for 
region home of record and ethnicity, as I did for reenlistment, to predict how these 
variables affected reason for separation. I ran the models 19 to 22 for all five separation 
reasons as well as immigrants and noncitizens and with and without control variables for 
a total of 40 regressions. 
(19) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + BZ 
(20) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + BZ 
(21) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ BZ 
(22) 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ BZ 
 47 
3. GI Bill Use  
To predict the propensity of noncitizens and immigrants of using the GI bill I ran 
the following models both with and without controls: 
(23) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
(24) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 
As was the case in our models for retention and attrition, I then included region 
home of record and ethnicity interactions with our noncitizen and immigrant variables as 
seen in models 25 to 28 both with and without controls for a total of 8 regressions.  
(25) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  BZ 
(26) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  BZ 
(27) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+  BZ 
(28) 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
+ 𝛽𝛽3ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +  BZ 
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A. PREDICTORS OF RETENTION BEYOND FIRST TERM  
The results provide a mixed picture of whether or not non-citizens are more or 
less likely to reenlist than their citizen counterparts; however, immigrants are consistently 
more likely to reenlist than non-immigrants. The results in Tables 8 and 9, show that 
noncitizens are more likely to reenlist, but when including control variables they are 
actually less likely to reenlist. The proportion of each is relatively close to 0 yet one can 
conclude that adding our controls has a negative effect on our coefficient for noncitizen. 
With such large sample sizes, such small coefficients, and the fact that the effects are 
only significant at the 5% level, one can conclude that non-citizens are not substantially 
different than citizens in terms of reenlistment. On the other hand, immigrants are 
significantly (1% level) more likely to reenlist than nonimmigrants regardless of controls 
and with very similar values of 3.7% and 3.1% respectively. 
Table 8. Noncitizen Reenlistments 
 





   
noncitizen 0.00219** -0.00364** 
 (0.000908) (0.00144) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 50 
Table 9. Immigrant Reenlistments 





   
immigrant 0.0311*** 0.00371*** 
 (0.000936) (0.00137) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To see if ethnic or regional differences drive differences in noncitizen or immigrant 
reenlistments, I interacted noncitizen and immigrant with region home of record and ethnic 
identity and ran restricted and unrestricted models. Table 10 summarizes our results for 
noncitizens. As before, the results for the impact of being a non-citizen on reenlistment are 
inconsistent, the coefficient on noncitizens becomes negative with the inclusion of control 
variables or regions suggesting that any significant and positive impact on reenlistment of 
being a non-citizen appears to be driven by demographic characteristics of many non-
citizens, not their non-citizen status itself. Our results also show, that with regional 
interactions, noncitizens from Asia are significantly more likely to re-enlist (1% level) than 
those from North America with values of 13.8% more likely without controls and 14.2% 
more likely with controls. Additionally, although noncitizens from all regions are no more 
or less likely to re-enlist than citizens, our results show that those from Europe, Central 
America, the Caribbean and Africa are significantly more likely to reenlist at the (1% level 
without controls) regardless of citizenship status. 
With the ethnicity interactions I arrived at different results. Asian noncitizens were 
no more or less likely to reenlist than other noncitizens but Pacific Islander noncitizens 
were 8.7% more likely to reenlist without controls and 6.4% more likely to reenlist with 
controls both at the 1% significance level. Our Pacific Islander ethnic variable includes 
observations from the Asian race, therefore, it is likely that our Asian ethnic variable 
decreased in significance due to this shift in observations. Similarly, Hispanics and 
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particularly Hispanic non-citizens are significantly more likely to reenlist (at the 1% level 
in all models) but only about 1% more than citizens in the “other” ethnicity category.  
Table 10. Noncitizen Reenlistment with Region and Ethnicity Interactions 









     
nonHS  0.0190***  0.0182*** 
  (0.00169)  (0.00170) 
somecollege  -0.0270***  -0.0270*** 
  (0.00100)  (0.00100) 
bachelors  -0.0543***  -0.0530*** 
  (0.00115)  (0.00115) 
mastersandabove  -0.0669***  -0.0664*** 
  (0.00409)  (0.00407) 
othereducation  -0.00673**  -0.00897*** 
  (0.00269)  (0.00270) 
AFQT_PCTL_SCR_QY  -0.000816***  -0.000792*** 
  (1.09e-05)  (1.09e-05) 
asianrace  0.00685***  0.00763*** 
  (0.00187)  (0.00186) 
blackrace  0.0213***  0.0224*** 
  (0.000574)  (0.000574) 
indiannative  0.0115***  0.0116*** 
  (0.00158)  (0.00158) 
pacificrace  0.0102***  0.00888*** 
  (0.00335)  (0.00336) 
asian  -0.00128   
  (0.00193)   
pacificislander  0.0361***   
  (0.00205)   
hispanic  0.00290***   
  (0.000585)   
PN_AGE_QY  0.00590***  0.00551*** 
  (6.19e-05)  (6.05e-05) 
DEP_QY  0.0278***  0.0284*** 
  (0.000207)  (0.000206) 
army  -0.0505***  -0.0495*** 
  (0.00119)  (0.00119) 
airforce  -0.0387***  -0.0353*** 
  (0.00158)  (0.00158) 
marines  -0.0996***  -0.0992*** 
  (0.00123)  (0.00123) 
1.noncitizen 0.00305*** -0.00514*** -0.00930*** -0.0234*** 
 (0.000914) (0.00144) (0.00240) (0.00257) 
1.asia 0.0307*** 0.0257***   
 (0.00503) (0.00823)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia 0.104*** 0.121***   
 (0.0185) (0.0274)   
1.middleeast 0.0454** 0.0801**   
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 (0.0223) (0.0353)   
1.europe 0.0306*** 0.0271***   
 (0.00373) (0.00639)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe -0.0166 0.0670   
 (0.0248) (0.0600)   
1.southamerica 0.0901** 0.0412   
 (0.0441) (0.0575)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica -0.195 -0.154   
 (0.157) (0.165)   
1.centralamerica 0.0811*** 0.0455   
 (0.0248) (0.0414)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica 0.100 0.203   
 (0.117) (0.160)   
1.carribean 0.0947*** 0.0845*   
 (0.0299) (0.0478)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean -0.199 -0.239   
 (0.127) (0.224)   
1.africa 0.0601*** 0.0346*   
 (0.0148) (0.0206)   
1.noncitizen#1.africa -0.0564 -0.0567   
 (0.0518) (0.0631)   
1.oceania 0.0589** 0.0578*   
 (0.0264) (0.0340)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania 0.0866 0.0506   
 (0.110) (0.159)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast -0.150    
 (0.153)    
1.asian   0.000576 0.00101 
   (0.00120) (0.00195) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   -0.0131*** -0.00428 
   (0.00438) (0.00479) 
1.pacificislander   0.0547*** 0.0328*** 
   (0.00130) (0.00208) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   0.0419*** 0.0547*** 
   (0.00432) (0.00485) 
1.hispanic   0.0182*** 0.00216*** 
   (0.000494) (0.000594) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.00665** 0.0307*** 
   (0.00295) (0.00333) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.031 0.001 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results for our immigrant interactions are shown in Table 11. One sees that Asian 
immigrants are 11% more likely to reenlist than those from North America at the 1% 
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significance level with and without controls. All immigrants from the other regions are no 
more or less likely to reenlist than nonimmigrants. Those from Asia, Europe, the 
Caribbean, Central America, and Africa are more likely to reenlist regardless of 
immigrant status and once again statistically significant at the 1% level (without 
controls). 
For our ethnic interactions with immigrants, I found that Pacific Islander and 
Hispanic immigrants, were more likely to reenlist. The proportion was higher for both 
ethnicities without controls. Pacific Islanders were 9.4% more likely to reenlist without 
controls and 5.5% more likely to reenlist with controls while Hispanics were 4.7% more 
likely to reenlist without controls and 1.2% more likely with controls. Overall, our results 
show that regardless of controls, both Pacific Islander and Hispanic immigrants are 
significantly (1% level) more likely to re-enlist than all other immigrants.  
Table 11. Immigrant Reenlistments with Region and Ethnicity Interactions 









     
1.immigrant 0.0302*** 0.00355*** 0.0196*** -0.00822*** 
 (0.000940) (0.00138) (0.00232) (0.00240) 
1.asia 0.0253*** 0.0212**   
 (0.00535) (0.00898)   
1.immigrant#1.asia 0.0541*** 0.0214   
 (0.0169) (0.0226)   
1.middleeast 0.0430* 0.0912**   
 (0.0241) (0.0387)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast -0.0568 -0.0698   
 (0.0635) (0.0941)   
1.europe 0.0327*** 0.0278***   
 (0.00385) (0.00655)   
1.immigrant#1.europe 0.00988 -0.0181   
 (0.0216) (0.0326)   
1.southamerica 0.0776 0.0229   
 (0.0514) (0.0660)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.0433 0.0152   
 (0.118) (0.168)   
1.centralamerica 0.0763*** 0.0317   
 (0.0256) (0.0417)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.128 0.746**   
 (0.125) (0.312)   
1.carribean 0.0946*** 0.0728   
 (0.0311) (0.0489)   
 54 









1.immigrant#1.carribean -0.00157 0.283   
 (0.105) (0.224)   
     
1.africa 0.0899*** 0.0474**   
 (0.0177) (0.0223)   
1.immigrant#1.africa -0.0524 -0.0719   
 (0.0575) (0.0763)   
1.oceania 0.0621** 0.0561   
 (0.0276) (0.0346)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania 0.142    
 (0.175)    
1.asian   -0.00221 0.00214 
   (0.00136) (0.00206) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   -0.00682* 0.00480 
   (0.00366) (0.00384) 
1.pacificislander   0.0465*** 0.0280*** 
   (0.00144) (0.00223) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   0.0274*** 0.0354*** 
   (0.00403) (0.00433) 
1.hispanic   0.0149*** 0.00238*** 
   (0.000513) (0.000609) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.0121*** 0.0178*** 
   (0.00309) (0.00335) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.030 0.001 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
B. PREDICTORS OF SEPARATION IN FIRST TERM 
Our results in Tables 12 through 16, show that noncitizens are slightly less likely 
to separate for reasons of body fat, dependency, drugs or alcohol, discipline issues or for 
not qualifying than are citizens at the 1% level of significance. With controls, noncitizens 
are no more likely or less likely to attrite for reasons of body fat, dependency and for not 
qualifying than citizens but they are still significantly less likely (1% level) to attrite for 
drugs/alcohol and disciplinary reasons. Therefore, due to the difference in results from 
our controlled and uncontrolled regressions, we conclude that overall noncitizens are 
slightly less or equally likely to attrite for all reasons.  
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Table 12. Noncitizen Body Fat Separation 
 (1) (2) 




   
noncitizen -0.000485*** -0.000193 
 (8.20e-05) (0.000143) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 13. Noncitizen Dependency Separation 





   
noncitizen -0.000605*** -0.000251 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14. Noncitizen Drugs/Alcohol Separation 





   
noncitizen -0.000759*** -0.000679*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000189) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15. Noncitizen Disciplinary Separation 





   
noncitizen -0.00209*** -0.000950*** 
 (0.000215) (0.000331) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 16. Noncitizen Unqualified Separation 





   
noncitizen -0.000779*** -0.000160 
 (0.000118) (0.000197) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 17 through 21 show us that like noncitizens, without controls, immigrants 
are less likely at the 1% level to attrite for any of these reasons. Yet, they are no more 
likely or less likely to attrite for all reasons but disciplinary than nonimmigrants with 
controls added. Once again, due to the difference in results from our controlled and 
uncontrolled regressions I find that immigrants are equally likely or significantly less 
likely to attrite for all five attrition reasons than nonimmigrants. 
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Table 17. Immigrant Body Fat Separation 
 (1) (2) 




   
immigrant -0.000257*** -0.000288** 
 (8.66e-05) (0.000138) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18. Immigrant Dependency Separation 





   
immigrant -0.000209** -9.16e-05 
 (0.000106) (0.000164) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 19. Immigrant Drugs/Alcohol Separation 





   
immigrant -0.000682*** -0.000238 
 (0.000125) (0.000182) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20. Immigrant Disciplinary Separation 





   
immigrant -0.00239*** -0.00128*** 
 (0.000227) (0.000319) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 21. Immigrant Unqualified Separation 





   
immigrant -0.000596*** 0.000129 
 (0.000125) (0.000190) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Interactions with regional and ethnic variables shows some heterogeneity among 
noncitizen groups. Our results from Tables 22 to 26 show what happens when interacting 
regional and ethnic variables with our noncitizen variable. I find that noncitizens from 
Europe are 1.2% more likely to attrite for dependency issues than are other noncitizen 
groups (at the 1% level and with no controls). Additionally, enlistees from the Middle 
East are more likely to attrite due to body fat regardless of citizenship status without 
controls (5% significance level) and with controls (1% significance level). They are also 
more likely to attrite for disciplinary issues without controls (1% significance level) and 
with controls (5% significance level). Enlistees from Europe are less likely to attrite due 
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to disciplinary reasons or reasons of not qualifying, regardless of citizenship status at the 
5% and 1% significance level and both without controls. Finally, Asians, are less likely to 
attrite for reasons of not qualifying, regardless of citizenship status and at the 5% 
significance level. 
With the ethnicity interactions, Asian noncitizens are less likely than other 
citizens to attrite for disciplinary issues (without controls) although the proportion is very 
close to 0 (-0.3%). Additionally, enlistees from all ethnicities are significantly less likely 
(1% level) to attrite for body fat, disciplinary, drugs/alcohol or not for not qualifying than 
enlistees in the “other” categories, regardless of citizenship status and without controls. 
Hispanics are also significantly less likely (1% level) to attrite for all reasons, regardless 
of citizenship status and with controls added. 
Table 22. Noncitizen Body Fat Separation with Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
1.noncitizen -0.000485*** -0.000192 -0.000842*** -0.000264 
 (8.39e-05) (0.000144) (0.000243) (0.000256) 
1.asia -0.000227 0.000491   
 (0.000462) (0.000823)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia -6.91e-05 -0.00123   
 (0.00170) (0.00274)   
1.middleeast 0.00465** 0.0120***   
 (0.00204) (0.00353)   
1.europe -0.000323 -0.00109*   
 (0.000343) (0.000639)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe 2.73e-05 0.000306   
 (0.00228) (0.00600)   
1.southamerica -0.000781 -0.000812   
 (0.00405) (0.00576)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica 0.000485 3.77e-05   
 (0.0144) (0.0165)   
1.centralamerica -0.000781 -0.000798   
 (0.00228) (0.00414)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica 0.000485 5.11e-05   
 (0.0107) (0.0160)   
1.carribean -0.000781 -0.000902   
 (0.00275) (0.00478)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean 0.000485 0.000498   
 (0.0117) (0.0224)   
1.africa -0.000781 -0.000952   
 (0.00136) (0.00206)   
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
1.noncitizen#1.africa 0.000485 0.000630   
 (0.00476) (0.00631)   
1.oceania -0.000781 -0.00103   
 (0.00242) (0.00340)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania 0.000485 0.00102   
 (0.0101) (0.0159)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast -0.00495    
 (0.0140)    
1.asian   -0.000523*** -0.000323* 
   (0.000122) (0.000194) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   0.000843* 0.000246 
   (0.000444) (0.000477) 
1.pacificislander   -0.000436*** -0.000286 
   (0.000132) (0.000207) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   0.000716 -2.41e-05 
   (0.000438) (0.000483) 
1.hispanic   -0.000362*** -0.000217*** 
   (5.02e-05) (5.92e-05) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.000464 9.65e-05 
   (0.000299) (0.000332) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 23. Noncitizen Dependency Separation with Interactions 









     
1.noncitizen -0.000619*** -0.000273 -0.000781*** -0.000456 
 (0.000102) (0.000171) (0.000288) (0.000304) 
1.asia 0.000789 0.000810   
 (0.000561) (0.000975)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia 0.00215 -0.00138   
 (0.00207) (0.00325)   
1.middleeast -0.00115 -0.00130   
 (0.00249) (0.00418)   
1.europe 0.000986** -0.000360   
 (0.000416) (0.000756)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe 0.0116*** 0.0365***   
 (0.00277) (0.00711)   
1.southamerica -0.00115 -0.00102   
 (0.00492) (0.00682)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica 0.000619 -5.05e-05   
 (0.0176) (0.0196)   
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1.centralamerica -0.00115 -0.00152   
 (0.00277) (0.00490)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralameric
a 
0.000619 -0.000368   
 (0.0130) (0.0190)   
1.carribean -0.00115 -0.00214   
 (0.00334) (0.00566)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean 0.000619 0.000850   
 (0.0142) (0.0266)   
1.africa -0.00115 -0.00169   
 (0.00165) (0.00244)   
1.noncitizen#1.africa 0.000619 0.000539   
 (0.00578) (0.00748)   
1.oceania -0.00115 -0.00148   
 (0.00295) (0.00403)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania 0.000619 0.00157   
 (0.0123) (0.0188)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast 0.000619    
 (0.0170)    
1.asian   -0.000540*** 0.000116 
   (0.000144) (0.000230) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   0.000281 0.000365 
   (0.000526) (0.000566) 
1.pacificislander   -0.000224 -6.86e-06 
   (0.000156) (0.000246) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislande
r 
  0.000385 0.000391 
   (0.000518) (0.000573) 
1.hispanic   -0.000276*** 3.26e-05 
   (5.94e-05) (7.02e-05) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   5.97e-05 0.000253 
   (0.000354) (0.000394) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 24. Noncitizen Drugs/Alcohol Separation with Interactions 









     
1.noncitizen -0.000758*** -0.000695*** -0.000714** -0.000939*** 
 (0.000124) (0.000191) (0.000314) (0.000339) 
1.asia -0.000316 0.000985   
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 (0.000682) (0.00109)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia -0.000626 -0.00125   
 (0.00251) (0.00364)   
     
1.middleeast -0.00170 -0.00158   
 (0.00302) (0.00469)   
1.europe -0.000480 -0.00164*   
 (0.000506) (0.000848)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe -0.000462 0.000949   
 (0.00337) (0.00796)   
1.southamerica -0.00170 -0.00118   
 (0.00598) (0.00764)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica 0.000758 0.00132   
 (0.0214) (0.0219)   
1.centralamerica -0.00170 -0.00130   
 (0.00337) (0.00549)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica 0.000758 0.000341   
 (0.0159) (0.0213)   
1.carribean -0.00170 -0.00130   
 (0.00406) (0.00635)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean 0.000758 0.000678   
 (0.0172) (0.0298)   
1.africa -0.00170 -0.000797   
 (0.00201) (0.00274)   
1.noncitizen#1.africa 0.000758 0.000254   
 (0.00703) (0.00838)   
1.oceania 0.00593* -0.00107   
 (0.00358) (0.00452)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania -0.00688 1.82e-05   
 (0.0149) (0.0211)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast 0.000758    
 (0.0207)    
1.asian   -0.000917*** -0.000402 
   (0.000157) (0.000256) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   1.39e-05 0.000101 
   (0.000573) (0.000631) 
1.pacificislander   -0.00112*** -0.000688** 
   (0.000170) (0.000274) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   0.000199 0.000222 
   (0.000565) (0.000639) 
1.hispanic   -0.000455*** -0.000548*** 
   (6.47e-05) (7.83e-05) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.000171 0.000491 
   (0.000386) (0.000439) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25. Noncitizen Disciplinary Separation with Interactions 









     
1.noncitizen -0.00225*** -0.00103*** -0.00265*** -0.00204*** 
 (0.000219) (0.000334) (0.000574) (0.000593) 
1.asia -3.71e-05 -0.00158   
 (0.00120) (0.00191)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia 0.000459 0.00732   
 (0.00443) (0.00635)   
1.middleeast 0.0219*** 0.0203**   
 (0.00533) (0.00818)   
1.europe -0.00210** -0.00112   
 (0.000893) (0.00148)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe 0.00563 -0.00300   
 (0.00593) (0.0139)   
1.southamerica -0.00530 -0.00369   
 (0.0105) (0.0133)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica 0.00225 0.000854   
 (0.0376) (0.0383)   
1.centralamerica -0.00530 -0.00466   
 (0.00594) (0.00959)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica 0.00225 0.00180   
 (0.0279) (0.0372)   
1.carribean -0.00530 -0.00447   
 (0.00715) (0.0111)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean 0.00225 -0.000623   
 (0.0304) (0.0520)   
1.africa -0.00289 -0.00409   
 (0.00355) (0.00478)   
1.noncitizen#1.africa -0.000162 0.00126   
 (0.0124) (0.0146)   
1.oceania -0.00530 -0.00481   
 (0.00631) (0.00788)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania 0.00225 0.00397   
 (0.0263) (0.0368)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast -0.0249    
 (0.0365)    
1.asian   -0.00226*** -0.000194 
   (0.000288) (0.000449) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   0.00235** 0.00260** 
   (0.00105) (0.00110) 
1.pacificislander   -0.00291*** -0.00145*** 
   (0.000311) (0.000480) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   0.00174* 0.00285** 
   (0.00103) (0.00112) 
1.hispanic   -0.00158*** -0.000861*** 
   (0.000118) (0.000137) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.00120* 0.000960 
   (0.000706) (0.000768) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
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R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 26. Noncitizen Unqualified Separation with Interactions 









     
1.noncitizen -0.000799*** -0.000155 -0.00113*** -0.000271 
 (0.000121) (0.000200) (0.000327) (0.000354) 
1.asia -0.00135** -0.000724   
 (0.000666) (0.00114)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia 0.000522 -0.000257   
 (0.00245) (0.00380)   
1.middleeast -0.00162 -0.00188   
 (0.00295) (0.00490)   
1.europe -0.00162*** -0.00180**   
 (0.000494) (0.000886)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe 0.000799 0.000365   
 (0.00329) (0.00832)   
1.southamerica -0.00162 -0.00124   
 (0.00584) (0.00798)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica 0.000799 -0.000255   
 (0.0208) (0.0229)   
1.centralamerica -0.00162 -0.00135   
 (0.00329) (0.00575)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica 0.000799 0.000894   
 (0.0155) (0.0223)   
1.carribean -0.00162 -0.00112   
 (0.00396) (0.00664)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean 0.000799 0.000180   
 (0.0168) (0.0311)   
1.africa 0.000785 0.00309   
 (0.00196) (0.00286)   
1.noncitizen#1.africa -0.00161 -0.00408   
 (0.00687) (0.00876)   
1.oceania -0.00162 -0.00178   
 (0.00350) (0.00472)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania 0.000799 0.000777   
 (0.0146) (0.0220)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast 0.000799    
 (0.0202)    
1.asian   -0.000824*** -0.000206 
   (0.000164) (0.000268) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   0.00160*** 0.00112* 
   (0.000599) (0.000658) 
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1.pacificislander   -0.000862*** -0.000248 
   (0.000177) (0.000286) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   0.000512 -0.000460 
   (0.000590) (0.000667) 
1.hispanic   -0.000679*** -0.000424*** 
   (6.76e-05) (8.17e-05) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.000513 6.37e-05 
   (0.000403) (0.000458) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our results from Tables 27 to 31 show what happened when regional and ethnic 
variables are interacted with the immigrant variable. None of our immigrants from the 
various regions are significantly more likely or less likely to attrite for any reasons than 
our nonimmigrants. Also, service members from the Middle East were more likely to 
separate for body fat reasons without controls (5% level), with controls (1% level) and 
also more likely to separate for disciplinary issues (1% level) than those from North 
America regardless of immigrant status. Additionally, those from Europe were less likely 
to separate for disciplinary issues regardless of immigrant status at the 5% level as well 
as for reasons of not qualifying with and without controls at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
Although, there are no significant results among our ethnicity immigrant 
interactions, the results show that Asians, Pacific Islanders and Hispanics are all less 
likely to attrite for reasons of body fat, dependency, drugs/alcohol, disciplinary or for 
reasons of not qualifying regardless of immigrant status and all at the 1% level without 
controls. With controls added, Hispanics are all less likely to attrite for all reasons except 
dependency at the 1% significance level. Additionally, Pacific Islanders are less likely to 
attrite for drugs/alcohol and disciplinary issues regardless of immigrant status with 
controls and at the 5% and 1% significance levels respectively.  
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Table 27. Immigrant Body Fat Separation with Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








1.immigrant -0.000260*** -0.000286** -0.000598** -0.000560** 
 (8.84e-05) (0.000139) (0.000238) (0.000241) 
1.asia -0.000163 0.000697   
 (0.000503) (0.000907)   
1.immigrant#1.asia -0.000377 -0.00128   
 (0.00159) (0.00228)   
1.middleeast 0.00565** 0.0146***   
 (0.00226) (0.00391)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast -0.00619 -0.0152   
 (0.00597) (0.00951)   
1.europe -0.000304 -0.00112*   
 (0.000362) (0.000661)   
1.immigrant#1.europe -0.000236 0.000521   
 (0.00204) (0.00329)   
1.southamerica -0.000800 -0.000759   
 (0.00483) (0.00666)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.000260 -7.30e-05   
 (0.0111) (0.0170)   
1.centralamerica -0.000800 -0.000819   
 (0.00241) (0.00421)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.000260 0.000156   
 (0.0117) (0.0315)   
1.carribean -0.000800 -0.000947   
 (0.00292) (0.00494)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean 0.000260 0.000231   
 (0.00983) (0.0226)   
1.africa -0.000800 -0.00112   
 (0.00167) (0.00225)   
1.immigrant#1.africa 0.000260 0.000727   
 (0.00541) (0.00770)   
1.oceania -0.000800 -0.00112   
 (0.00259) (0.00350)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania 0.000260    
 (0.0165)    
1.asian   -0.000566*** -0.000364* 
   (0.000140) (0.000207) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   0.000782** 0.000556 
   (0.000376) (0.000386) 
1.pacificislander   -0.000417*** -0.000320 
   (0.000148) (0.000224) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   0.000505 0.000503 
   (0.000414) (0.000436) 
1.hispanic   -0.000345*** -0.000200*** 
   (5.27e-05) (6.12e-05) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.000450 0.000268 
   (0.000318) (0.000336) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28. Immigrant Dependency Separation with Interactions 









     
1.immigrant -0.000213** -0.000116 -0.000240 -0.000467 
 (0.000108) (0.000165) (0.000282) (0.000286) 
1.asia 0.000414 -0.000498   
 (0.000612) (0.00107)   
1.immigrant#1.asia 0.00434** 0.00835***   
 (0.00193) (0.00270)   
1.middleeast -0.00118 -0.00134   
 (0.00275) (0.00462)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast 0.000213 0.000344   
 (0.00726) (0.0112)   
1.europe 0.000805* -0.000332   
 (0.000441) (0.000783)   
1.immigrant#1.europe 0.00328 -0.000728   
 (0.00248) (0.00390)   
1.southamerica -0.00118 -0.000987   
 (0.00588) (0.00788)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.000213 -0.00128   
 (0.0135) (0.0201)   
1.centralamerica -0.00118 -0.00152   
 (0.00293) (0.00499)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.000213 -0.000599   
 (0.0143) (0.0373)   
1.carribean -0.00118 -0.00218   
 (0.00355) (0.00585)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean 0.000213 0.000944   
 (0.0120) (0.0268)   
1.africa -0.00118 -0.00177   
 (0.00203) (0.00267)   
1.immigrant#1.africa 0.000213 0.000272   
 (0.00658) (0.00911)   
1.oceania -0.00118 -0.00151   
 (0.00315) (0.00414)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania 0.000213    
 (0.0200)    
1.asian   -0.000647*** -5.08e-06 
   (0.000166) (0.000246) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   0.000739* 0.000910** 
   (0.000445) (0.000458) 
1.pacificislander   -0.000113 -1.09e-05 
   (0.000175) (0.000266) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   -0.000372 0.000196 
   (0.000490) (0.000516) 
1.hispanic   -0.000246*** 3.25e-05 
   (6.24e-05) (7.25e-05) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.000283 0.000490 
   (0.000376) (0.000399) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 29. Immigrant Drugs/Alcohol Separation with Interactions 









     
1.immigrant -0.000682*** -0.000237 -0.000470 -0.000406 
 (0.000127) (0.000184) (0.000306) (0.000318) 
1.asia -0.000392 0.00128   
 (0.000725) (0.00120)   
1.immigrant#1.asia -0.000592 -0.00187   
 (0.00229) (0.00301)   
1.middleeast -0.00167 -0.00164   
 (0.00326) (0.00517)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast 0.000682 0.000536   
 (0.00861) (0.0126)   
1.europe -0.000344 -0.00167*   
 (0.000522) (0.000875)   
1.immigrant#1.europe -0.000641 0.000725   
 (0.00294) (0.00435)   
1.southamerica -0.00167 -0.00107   
 (0.00696) (0.00881)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.000682 -2.85e-05   
 (0.0160) (0.0225)   
1.centralamerica -0.00167 -0.00127   
 (0.00347) (0.00557)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.000682 -0.00115   
 (0.0169) (0.0417)   
1.carribean -0.00167 -0.00126   
 (0.00421) (0.00653)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean 0.000682 -0.00121   
 (0.0142) (0.0299)   
1.africa -0.00167 -0.000925   
 (0.00240) (0.00298)   
1.immigrant#1.africa 0.000682 0.000329   
 (0.00779) (0.0102)   
1.oceania 0.00681* -0.00115   
 (0.00374) (0.00462)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania -0.00779    
 (0.0237)    
1.asian   -0.000857*** -0.000385 
   (0.000180) (0.000273) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   0.000214 0.000328 
   (0.000483) (0.000509) 
1.pacificislander   -0.00105*** -0.000670** 
   (0.000190) (0.000295) 
1o.immigrant#0b.pacificislander   0 0 
   (0) (0) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   9.62e-05 0.000268 
   (0.000532) (0.000574) 
1.hispanic   -0.000497*** -0.000558*** 
   (6.77e-05) (8.07e-05) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.000104 0.000190 
   (0.000408) (0.000443) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 30. Immigrant Disciplinary Separation with Interactions 









     
1.immigrant -0.00237*** -0.00130*** -0.00241*** -0.00177*** 
 (0.000230) (0.000322) (0.000560) (0.000557) 
1.asia -0.000336 -0.00227   
 (0.00131) (0.00210)   
1.immigrant#1.asia 0.000134 0.00494   
 (0.00413) (0.00527)   
1.middleeast 0.0204*** 0.00983   
 (0.00588) (0.00903)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast 0.0150 0.0629***   
 (0.0155) (0.0220)   
1.europe -0.00196** -0.00101   
 (0.000941) (0.00153)   
1.immigrant#1.europe -0.00110 -0.00194   
 (0.00529) (0.00761)   
1.southamerica -0.00543 -0.00401   
 (0.0125) (0.0154)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.00237 0.000831   
 (0.0287) (0.0393)   
1.centralamerica -0.00543 -0.00471   
 (0.00625) (0.00974)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.00237 -0.00124   
 (0.0305) (0.0729)   
1.carribean -0.00543 -0.00439   
 (0.00759) (0.0114)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean 0.00237 -0.00172   
 (0.0255) (0.0523)   
1.africa -0.00193 -0.00431   
 (0.00433) (0.00521)   
1.immigrant#1.africa -0.00112 0.00158   
 (0.0140) (0.0178)   
1.oceania -0.00543 -0.00493   
 (0.00673) (0.00808)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania 0.00237    
 (0.0428)    
1.asian   -0.00213*** -0.000153 
   (0.000330) (0.000479) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   0.00177** 0.00134 
   (0.000885) (0.000892) 
1.pacificislander   -0.00251*** -0.00135*** 
   (0.000349) (0.000518) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   0.000398 0.000956 
   (0.000975) (0.00101) 
1.hispanic   -0.00144*** -0.000830*** 
   (0.000124) (0.000141) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.000676 0.000275 
   (0.000748) (0.000777) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 31. Immigrant Unqualified Separation with Interactions  









     
1.immigrant -0.000612*** 0.000134 -0.000498 0.000117 
 (0.000128) (0.000193) (0.000321) (0.000332) 
1.asia -0.00136* -0.000658   
 (0.000728) (0.00126)   
1.immigrant#1.asia 0.000294 -0.000368   
 (0.00230) (0.00316)   
1.middleeast -0.00168 -0.00195   
 (0.00328) (0.00541)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast 0.000612 0.000272   
 (0.00865) (0.0132)   
1.europe -0.00168*** -0.00184**   
 (0.000525) (0.000916)   
1.immigrant#1.europe 0.000612 0.000469   
 (0.00295) (0.00456)   
1.southamerica -0.00168 -0.00122   
 (0.00700) (0.00923)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica 0.000612 -0.000336   
 (0.0160) (0.0235)   
1.centralamerica -0.00168 -0.00135   
 (0.00349) (0.00584)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.000612 0.000121   
 (0.0170) (0.0437)   
1.carribean -0.00168 -0.00109   
 (0.00423) (0.00684)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean 0.000612 -0.000951   
 (0.0142) (0.0314)   
1.africa 0.00181 0.00368   
 (0.00241) (0.00312)   
1.immigrant#1.africa -0.00288 -0.00443   
 (0.00783) (0.0107)   
1.oceania -0.00168 -0.00184   
 (0.00376) (0.00484)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania 0.000612    
 (0.0239)    
1.asian   -0.000806*** -0.000179 
   (0.000189) (0.000285) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   0.000442 -0.000109 
   (0.000507) (0.000532) 
1.pacificislander   -0.000803*** -0.000215 
   (0.000200) (0.000309) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   0.000229 -5.29e-05 
   (0.000558) (0.000600) 
1.hispanic   -0.000624*** -0.000418*** 
   (7.10e-05) (8.43e-05) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   0.000231 0.000122 
   (0.000428) (0.000463) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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C. PREDICTORS OF GI BILL USE 
The results from Table 32 show that noncitizens are 6.5% more likely to use the 
GI bill than are citizens. The values for our noncitizen models with and without controls 
were significant (1% level) but the value increased to 8.9% with controls. Like 
noncitizens, as shown in Table 33, immigrants are also more likely to use the GI bill but 
our results are only significant (1% level) with controls. Our values show that a much 
larger number of noncitizens tend to make use of the GI bill as compared to citizens than 
do immigrants. 
Table 32. Noncitizen GI Bill Use 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
   
noncitizen 0.0650*** 0.0889*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00173) 
   
Observations 5,553,751 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.001 0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 33. Immigrant GI Bill Use 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
   
immigrant -0.000735 0.00686*** 
 (0.00121) (0.00165) 
   
Observations 5,246,922 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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After adding regional interactions, as shown in Table 34, I found that Asian and 
South American noncitizens were 2.5% and 18.5% less likely to use the GI bill. 
Additionally, regardless of citizenship status, those from Europe were less likely to use 
the GI bill (with and without controls) than those from North America, and those from 
Central American were more likely to use the GI bill (with and without controls) than 
those from North America. The proportions are particularly large for people from Central 
America who are 30% more likely to use the GI without controls and 19.4% more likely 
with controls. When I added ethnicity interactions, I found that Asian, Pacific Islander 
and Hispanic noncitizens were more likely to use the GI bill. Asian noncitizens were 
13.2% more likely to use the bill, Pacific Islanders noncitizens were 10.6% more likely 
and Hispanic noncitizens were 13% more likely to use it.  
Table 34. Noncitizen GI Bill Use With Interactions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
     
1.noncitizen 0.0683*** 0.0887*** 0.0785*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.00118) (0.00173) (0.00292) (0.00310) 
1.asia -0.0403*** -0.0145   
 (0.00648) (0.00988)   
1.noncitizen#1.asia -0.0531** 0.00582   
 (0.0239) (0.0329)   
1.middleeast -0.0490* -0.0768*   
 (0.0287) (0.0424)   
1.europe -0.0408*** -0.0439***   
 (0.00481) (0.00767)   
1.noncitizen#1.europe 0.0377 -0.00970   
 (0.0319) (0.0720)   
1.southamerica 0.177*** 0.0621   
 (0.0568) (0.0691)   
1.noncitizen#1.southamerica -0.430** -0.286   
 (0.203) (0.198)   
1.centralamerica 0.302*** 0.194***   
 (0.0320) (0.0497)   
1.noncitizen#1.centralamerica -0.126 -0.484**   
 (0.151) (0.192)   
1.carribean 0.0308 0.0764   
 (0.0385) (0.0574)   
1.noncitizen#1.carribean -0.117 0.171   
 (0.163) (0.269)   
1.africa -0.0162 -0.00159   
 (0.0191) (0.0248)   
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
     
1.noncitizen#1.africa -0.102 -0.0874   
 (0.0668) (0.0758)   
1.oceania 0.0289 0.00593   
 (0.0340) (0.0408)   
1.noncitizen#1.oceania -0.282** -0.130   
 (0.142) (0.190)   
1.noncitizen#1.middleeast 0.0459    
 (0.197)    
1.asian   0.0375*** 0.0136*** 
   (0.00146) (0.00234) 
1.noncitizen#1.asian   0.0160*** 0.0226*** 
   (0.00533) (0.00576) 
1.pacificislander   0.00392** -0.0145*** 
   (0.00158) (0.00251) 
1.noncitizen#1.pacificislander   -0.0235*** -0.00412 
   (0.00525) (0.00584) 
1.hispanic   0.0424*** 0.0194*** 
   (0.000602) (0.000715) 
1.noncitizen#1.hispanic   0.00940*** 0.0286*** 
   (0.00359) (0.00401) 
     
Observations 5,403,807 2,555,531 2,857,602 2,585,168 
R-squared 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For immigrants, as shown in Table 35, I did not see significant results from our 
interaction of immigrant status and region home of record although, those from Asia 
(without controls) and Europe (with and without controls) were less likely to use the GI 
bill at the 1% level regardless of immigrant status. Additionally, those from Central 
American were 18.3% more likely to use the bill with controls and 27.4% more likely 
without controls. With our ethnic interactions, there were no statistically significant 
results, but our results showed that Asians and Hispanics were more likely to use the GI 
bill, regardless of immigrant status and both with and without controls and at the 1% 
significance level. On the other hand, Pacific Islanders are 2% less likely to use the GI 
bill regardless of immigrant status at the 1% significance level than “other” immigrants. 
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Table 35. Immigrant GI Bill Use With Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(No controls) 
GI Bill Ever 
(With controls) 
     
1.immigrant -0.00156 0.00584*** 0.0109*** 0.00138 
 (0.00122) (0.00165) (0.00281) (0.00288) 
1.asia -0.0425*** -0.0183*   
 (0.00694) (0.0108)   
1.immigrant#1.asia 0.0357 0.0206   
 (0.0219) (0.0271)   
1.middleeast -0.0242 -0.0553   
 (0.0312) (0.0464)   
1.immigrant#1.middleeast -0.160* -0.134   
 (0.0824) (0.113)   
1.europe -0.0409*** -0.0421***   
 (0.00500) (0.00785)   
1.immigrant#1.europe -0.0320 -0.0498   
 (0.0281) (0.0391)   
1.southamerica 0.167** -0.0124   
 (0.0667) (0.0791)   
1.immigrant#1.southamerica -0.351** -0.124   
 (0.153) (0.202)   
1.centralamerica 0.274*** 0.183***   
 (0.0332) (0.0500)   
1.immigrant#1.centralamerica 0.542*** 0.608   
 (0.162) (0.374)   
1.carribean 0.0510 0.0869   
 (0.0403) (0.0587)   
1.immigrant#1.carribean -0.235* -0.255   
 (0.136) (0.269)   
1.africa 0.00678 -0.0223   
 (0.0230) (0.0267)   
1.immigrant#1.africa -0.0574 0.0764   
 (0.0746) (0.0915)   
1.oceania 0.0518 0.0106   
 (0.0358) (0.0415)   
1.immigrant#1.oceania -0.236    
 (0.227)    
1.asian   0.0363*** 0.0139*** 
   (0.00166) (0.00248) 
1.immigrant#1.asian   -0.00401 0.000284 
   (0.00445) (0.00462) 
1.pacificislander   -0.00225 -0.0200*** 
   (0.00175) (0.00268) 
1.immigrant#1.pacificislander   0.0231*** 0.0283*** 
   (0.00490) (0.00521) 
1.hispanic   0.0452*** 0.0199*** 
   (0.000623) (0.000732) 
1.immigrant#1.hispanic   -0.00514 0.00437 
   (0.00376) (0.00402) 
     
Observations 5,111,083 2,492,813 2,763,011 2,521,743 
R-squared 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Overall our analysis showed that immigrants reenlist at higher rates than 
nonimmigrants, citizens and noncitizens. Additionally, both immigrants and noncitizens 
separate less and make more use of the GI bill than their nonimmigrant and citizen 
counterparts. First, in terms of reenlistment, both immigrants and noncitizens from Asia 
reenlist at higher rates than citizens from North America. Additionally, immigrant and 
noncitizen service members from Europe, Central America, the Caribbean and Africa all 
reenlist at higher rates than those from North America regardless of immigrant or 
citizenship status. Our ethnicity interactions showed that Pacific Islander noncitizens and 
immigrants also reenlist at higher rates than those in the “other” category while Hispanic 
immigrants and Hispanics in general reenlist at higher rates than do “other” ethnicities.  
While they may be drivers of difficulty enlisting for some immigrants/non-
citizens, in terms of separations, noncitizens and immigrants as a whole were less likely 
to separate for all five reasons (body fat, dependency, drugs/alcohol, disciplinary and 
unqualified) even when I included regional and ethnic interactions. Our only exception 
were noncitizens from Europe who were 1.2% more likely to attrite for dependency 
issues. In fact, the results showed that all ethnic categories, regardless of 
citizenship/immigrant status were less likely to attrite for all reasons than were those in 
the “other” category which included Eskimos, U.S. or Canadian Indian Tribes as well as 
other Alaskan natives. 
Lastly, in terms of GI bill usage, both noncitizens and immigrants were more 
likely to use the GI bill but our results were more significant among noncitizens who 
overall were 6.5% more likely to use the benefit than were citizens. However, this 
propensity varied substantially by region and ethnicity. However, this propensity varies 
substantially by region and ethnicity. With regional interactions, the results were more 
substantial and one finds that Asian and South American noncitizens were 2.5% and 
18.5% less likely to use the GI bill. Also, our results showed that a large percentage of 
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Central Americans are more likely to use the GI bill both with and without controls. 
Additionally, all ethnicities were over 10% more likely to use the GI bill than the “other” 
category. 
Based on our results I can state that both immigrants and noncitizens are a reliable 
source of manpower especially due to their regional and ethnic backgrounds. Although I 
did not get results showing that noncitizens reenlist at larger proportions as I did with 
immigrants, or that both groups separate at substantially lesser rates than do citizens and 
nonimmigrants, ethnicities as well as regional characteristics particular to both 
noncitizens and immigrants, do make service members more likely to reenlist and less 
likely to attrite. For these reasons and because they provide a wealth of language and 
cultural skills that the military can capitalize on, continuing to study the various other 
pre-accession predictors of noncitizen and immigrant service can assist the military in 
effectively recruiting these groups.  
Additionally, based on the results from GI bill usage, it is clear noncitizens and 
immigrants both value the GI bill as an incentive. Specifically, those who originate from 
other regions besides North America, tend to value the GI bill even more as do all 
ethnicities. Therefore, by continually offering it, the DoD can continue to meet its 
military manpower needs.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although there were a large number of variables available from our DMDC 
database, had I had data available on those who accessed into the services under the 
MANVI program, I could have taken a closer look at a special category of immigrants 
who are currently serving in the military but have yet to even attain LPR. As our pool of 
eligible recruits continues to diminish, the U.S. military will have to rely on creative 
ways to attract new talent. I recommend DMDC attains data on those service members 
who have enlisted under the MANVI program so that in the future, if the services have to 
expand the ratings available under the program, there is data to defend or argue against 
expansion based on results. 
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Also, in future studies, it would be beneficial to look just at Hispanics to see how 
the various ethnic groups within the category differ. Since our results from Central 
America and South America differed so much, it would also be beneficial to compare 
these two regions and break them up into separate countries to analyze them even further. 
Are there elements such as education or even effects of civil-military relations which 
affect how immigrants and noncitizens from the various countries perform once in the 
service? Lastly, apart from country of origin, I think it would be very beneficial to look at 
the effect of state of origin on performance. This could yield important information on 
how well or how poorly noncitizens and immigrants from the various states perform 
which is not just important for the Navy to know so that it distributes its resources 
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